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ABSTRACT 
Risk analysis is a science of understanding and quantifying the probability of the 
occurrence(s) of undesirable event(s). Traditionally, risk assessments have been 
concerned with the management of safety based incidents. Recent attacks on chemical 
facilities in the Middle East and Northern Africa illustrate the need to broaden the risk 
management mindset. This body of work proposes quantitative barrier-based 
methodologies to assist management of broad-based decision-making processes. This 
research began by exploiting concepts from security-based research accompanied with a 
barrier-based methodology from safety research through both fault and event trees. This 
work expands into mapping the trees onto Bayesian Networks to manipulate the 
conditional probability table of intermediate variables. This manipulation allows for the 
implementation of various relaxation assumptions. Case studies accompany each 
proposed approach to illustrate its execution. The goal of this work is to raise awareness 
of quantitative security based methodologies and to assist in critical decision-making. 
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Introduction and Overview 
Risk analysis is a science of understanding and quantifying the probability of the 
occurrence of undesired events and associated outcomes. It aims to demystify uncertainty 
connected with these undesired events and outcomes. The chemical process industry 
encourages the application of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as a risk analysis 
method to study the occurrence of low probability – high consequence accidents. 
Through implementation of the methodologies, these accidents and their outcomes can be 
mitigated.  Risk analysis in the area of chemical safety is focused on unintentional acts 
whereas, in chemical security, risk analysis focuses on intentional acts.  Following the 
attacks on September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
granted the authority to manage security risk in chemical plants within the United States 
(U.S.) (DHS, 2003). The goal of the DHS was to regulate security of chemical plants 
involving high risk chemicals (DHS, 2003). This goal led to the development of PRA as a 
risk analysis method by using estimates of different components of risk, based on 
opinions of experts in the industry (Sadiq 2013). Furthermore, the development of 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) imposed federal regulations on 
chemical facilities considered to be at high risk (DHS, 2007). Later, Sadiq (2013) 
recognized that CFATS still needed improvements and implored researchers to further 
investigate how enhancements could be made in PRA technique.  
There has been much controversy over which technique is best suited to conduct a 
risk analysis associated with terrorism. The National Research Council (NRC) (2008) 
highlighted the difficulty in assessing the proper risk probability as techniques are based 
solely on expert opinion. However, Ezell et al. (2010) argued that while there are 
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shortcomings in PRA technique, this methodology can still be utilized effectively to 
understand terrorism risk. The methodologies presented in this thesis go one step further 
in addressing the concern of the NRC. Within this research, we obtain the initial risk 
estimates based on the use of existing PRA method.  We then use these values as prior 
probabilities in the Bayesian analysis techniques to continually update the security risk 
probabilities based on real data on incidents as they unfold over time and provide 
estimates of realistic risk probabilities in real time.     
The methodologies presented in the subsequent chapters are based on barrier 
approach methods known as epidemiological accident models. Epidemiological accident 
models can easily be understood through Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” model (1990). 
Reason’s model proposes that each “slice of cheese” acts as a barrier and an accident 
occurs when holes in the barriers align. The hole in a barrier can be a failure or a 
weakness of the system which then illustrates that an accident is a process of multiple 
causalities. To better depict the complete accident process, Kujath et al. (2010) combined 
Reason (1990) and Bird and Germain (1996) to develop a conceptual model for an 
offshore environment. This qualitative barrier approach with five mechanical barriers 
used both fault trees and an event trees to illustrate the escalation of an accident if a 
particular barrier was to fail.  
Rathnayaka et al. (2011) further enhanced the conceptual model proposed by 
Kujath et al. (2010) to expand the model to all process industries. System hazard 
identification, prevention and prediction (SHIPP) methodology added the dimension of 
event tree analysis and basic probability failure to transform the approach into a 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). In addition, the authors added two more barriers that 
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account for human interaction within the system. The quantitative component was 
executed through event tree analysis (ETA) and determineed the likelihood of various 
types of accidents. Rathanayaka et al. (2011) introduced an updating mechanism and 
predictive component which minimized uncertainties. The predictive component used 
past history data to determine the expected future events in the subsequent time interval. 
Meanwhile, the updating mechanism utilized new information and data based on the 
number of events that occurred as they occur to update the likelihood of each 
consequence.  
Probabilistic risk assessments can be executed through the use of fault and event 
trees, Bayesian Networks (BN), and Bow-Tie models. Fault and event tree analysis is 
widely used and is a common approach to determine the failure probability of a system. 
A top event or system failure can be broken down into further sub systems and 
components linked through Boolean logic gates. At the base of each fault tree are the 
basic events, typically failures, that may trigger the gate above it based on the logic 
assigned. Basic event probability can be found through historical data, literature, or where 
needed, expert judgment.  Event tree analysis is utilized to show the sequence of failures 
that lead to the various consequences. The top event probability, which can be 
represented by a barrier or system failure, helps to calculate the occurrence probabilities 
for each consequence. Delvosalle et al. (2005) described a Bow-Tie model as a fault tree 
that ties directly into an event tree. The basic events are on the left side and consequences 
are on the right side. Furthermore, both the fault and event trees can be mapped into 
Bayesian Networks (BN) (Bobbio et al. 2001). BN are graphical method used to illustrate 
relationships between events and outcomes. A parent node (event) will have a direct arc 
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to a child node (outcome), where the arc denotes a direct relationship between the two 
nodes. A BN has the ability to combine any finite number of variables into one joint 
probability distribution (Díez and Druzdel 2007). Through the graphical presentation, BN 
have the ability to aid decision makers as they perceive the direction of casual influence 
of one variable over another. Additionally, BN allows for the conditional probability 
table (CPT) to be manipulated. Pearl (1988) first introduced the concept of Noisy-OR, 
where a probability exists that may inhibit the parent node to cause the child node even if 
the parent node is still active. Other CPT manipulations have been developed such as, the 
Leaky Noisy-OR and the Noisy-AND (Díez and Druzdel 2007). The Leaky Noisy-OR is 
a similar cause to the Noisy-OR however, it adds a leak parameter that accounts for 
causes that could not be explicitly modelled (Adedigba et al. 2016; Abimbola et al. 2016). 
Meanwhile, the Noisy-AND adds a substitution probability that is replaced when a node 
is not active. Therefore, in the Noisy-AND technique, a parent node will either have a 
substitution or inhibitor probability.  
While chemical safety risk assessments focus on natural-unintentional events, 
chemical security risk assessments concentrate on unnatural-intentional acts. Chemical 
processing facilities are targets for both criminal and terrorist acts as they contain 
hazardous, expensive materials in large quantities which may cause substantial 
causalities, economic loss, and have an environmental impact. In 2003, the Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS, 2003) released a document that outlined a Security 
Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) that discussed physical security analysis for a chemical 
site including management and prevention strategies. The CCPS (2003) described 
multiple concepts and defined numerous terms such as, rings of protection. Rings of 
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protection is a concept whereby, the most valuable assets are located in the center and 
each ring has increasing security measures to further protect the asset. An intruder must 
penetrate numerous rings to reach the asset. The SVA methodology (CCPS, 2003) is 
broken down into five [5] steps which are: (1) Project Planning, (2) Facility 
Characterization, (3) Threat Assessment, (4) Vulnerability Analysis, and (5) Identify 
Countermeasures. The goal of project planning is to outline the objectives and scope 
developed by a multifaceted team. Facility characterization identifies critical assets, 
attractiveness of a target, and the possible consequences. Threat assessment defines the 
threats which may be internal, external, or a combination of an internal source colluding 
with an external source. The vulnerability analysis step combines an asset with a threat to 
evaluate the degree of vulnerability through either an asset-based approach and/or a 
scenario-based approach. Lastly, countermeasures are identified to provide improvements 
that would meet the security standards designated by the SVA team.  
Within this thesis, we combined quantitative measures found in the safety 
discipline with the qualitative components of the security approach. Through this 
amalgamation, separate methodologies have been developed and demonstrated through 
case studies in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 1, entitled ‘A Barrier Based 
Methodology to Asses Site Security Risk’, builds the basis for the subsequent two chapters 
entitled ‘SVAPP Methodology: A Predictive Security Vulnerability Assessment Modelling 
Method’ (Chapter 2) and ‘Functional Quantitative Security Risk Analysis (QSRA) to 
Assist in Protecting Critical Process Infrastructure’ (Chapter 3).  
In Chapter 1, the initial fault trees for each barrier are developed and the event 
tree is established. Furthermore, each fault and event tree are mapped into BN and each 
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CPT manipulation technique mentioned is explored. Chapter 2 proposes a Security 
Vulnerability Assessment, Prevention and Prediction (SVAPP) methodology that builds 
upon the foundations of Chapter 1 and continues to explore the relationships among the 
separate mapped barriers. The SVAPP, similar to SHIPP, executes an updating 
mechanism to continually obtain more accurate estimates of uncertainty (risk).   It also 
has a prediction component to predict the total number of incidents that can be expected 
for the next time frame.  
Chapter 3 is an independent methodology that utilizes the Bow-Tie concept to 
determine the overall attack probability and the subsequent consequence occurrence 
probabilities. The mapped fault tree to determine the attack probability adds more to 
detail the political barrier that was illustrated in Chapter 1. Additionally, the probabilities 
are altered depending on the various type of attacks that could be orchestrated on a 
chemical processing plant. If the risk is deemed not acceptable, the QSRA methodology 
allows for reassessment through a cost analysis of risk reduction strategies. The proposed 
QSRA approach contains a risk monitoring and tracking component through the use of 
key indicators, to ensure a re-assessment of the security program if an indicator changes.  
As illustrated through the subsequent chapters, the goal of this manuscript is to 
raise awareness for the need of quantitative security methodologies to assist in an overall 
risk analysis of a chemical processing plant.   
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Chapter 1: A Barrier Based Methodology to Assess Site Security Risk 
1.0 Abstract 
The recent attacks on petroleum plants in various countries such as Algeria, 
Nigeria, and Iraq have greatly changed the risk mindset of the chemical industry (Johnson 
and Gilbert, 2013; Nordland and Al-Sahy, 2014). Risk assessments and management 
traditionally are conducted on unintended (safety related) incidents and not on intentional 
acts. These intentional acts could either be from an internal or external source. This paper 
extends the probabilistic risk assessment methodology (generally focus on safety 
unintended) to the security facet (focusing on intended incidents) of a processing facility.  
The methodology is based on the barrier approach. Five security barriers are proposed 
throughout the facility to help deter an attack. These security barriers are external, 
internal, interior, critical, and the fail-safe barrier, which are implemented at various 
stages of a plant with varying objectives. For example, the fail-safe barrier aims to bring 
the plant to safe shutdown mode, once it observes breach of the barrier. Breach of each 
barrier is modeled using fault tree approach. A number of monitoring parameters are 
proposed to track the effectiveness of the barrier, which are modeled as basic events in 
the fault tree. The occurrence of each basic event is modeled using two failure modes: i) 
natural, and ii) forced failure. Conditional probability with soft computing theory is used 
to model occurrence probability. The proposed methodology also takes into account 
effectiveness of the management, and political parameters in an impeding attack.  
In addition, the fault trees modeled are mapped into respective Bayesian 
Networks. Bayesian networks allow for manipulation of the conditional probability table. 
There are three relaxation assumptions that manipulate the conditional probability table 
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that is explored in this paper. In order to eliminate uncertainty developed in the data, an 
updating mechanism is used along with a predictive component to make the model 
dynamic. This is significant as the model can be become dynamic to reflect any changes 
that may have occurred.  
Finally, a case study of a typical processing facility is presented to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the model and to indicate areas of further improvement. This paper 
aspires to bring awareness to security risk assessments and the need to create a database 
for security related failures. 
1.1 Introduction 
 Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, risk assessments completed for 
chemical facilities focused primarily on safety incidents or natural events. Through risk 
analysis, the facilities were able to plan for not only the high frequency-low consequence 
accidents but also the low frequency-high consequence events. In the years immediately 
following 9/11, both the American Chemistry Council (ACC) and the American 
Petroleum Institute (API) released documents to aid chemical companies in conducting 
site security vulnerability assessments (SVAs) to help prevent attacks. 
With current available security methodology, the need for continual improvement 
will always exist. In late February of 2006, the Abqaiq refinery in Saudi Arabia went 
under a terrorist attack from Islamic militants (BBC 2006). Vehicles with explosives 
attempted to gain access and cause damage to the world’s largest refinery. At the cost of 
two security guard fatalities, the refinery was able to foil the attack and prevent any 
disruption. Almost three years after this attack, Iraq’s largest oil refinery was shut down 
for several weeks due to a terrorist bombing (Al-Bazee 2011). Not only was the 
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production of 150,000 barrels per day halted but four workers lost their lives. The most 
recent incident was the attack on the In Amenas gas refinery on January 16, 2013 that 
lasted three days (Hagen 2013). In total, forty [40] workers were killed throughout the 
duration of the attack. The above examples verify that security failures led to financial 
loss, material loss and most importantly loss of human life. Therefore, the need to create 
a proper security risk assessment is crucial. 
Existing security risk methodologies are qualitative and based on SVAs that 
include a threat and vulnerability analysis. There is a need to develop a quantitative 
model and respective data. Through this quantification, models will have the ability to 
become more accurate and thus expose the weak points in a security management system. 
With this knowledge the appropriate measures can be taken to further deter and/or 
prevent attacks from happening.  
The first methodology for modeling a safety incident was developed by Heinrich 
(1941). He proposed that accidents happen in chain of events or a sequence, and removal 
of any one element could therefore prevent the accident from occurring. Later, Reason 
(1990) developed the infamous “Swiss Cheese” model shown in Figure 1-1 below. This 
model proposed that each slice was a relevant barrier and each hole represented a 
weakness or a failure the system. An accident occurs when all of the holes align, 
otherwise it does not occur.  
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Figure 1 - 1: Swiss Cheese Model: Swiss Cheese Model (Adapted from Reason, 2000) 
Further building upon this idea, was Kujath et al. (2010) who showed that each 
barrier could be described using fault tree analysis (FTA). Based in an offshore 
environment, the authors illustrated how basic event failures would lead to a barrier 
failure and thus an eventual accident. To provide a more holistic view, Rathnayaka et al. 
(2011) developed system hazard identification, prevention, and prediction (SHIPP) 
methodology based on the Kujath conceptual model. The conceptual accident model of 
SHIPP is shown Figure 1-2 and similar to Kujath, each barrier is built using FTA. 
Through the use of reliability data handbooks and expert judgment, the SHIPP method is 
able to assess and manage risk as well as represent the process accident sequence.  
 
Figure 1 - 2: SHIPP Conceptual Accident Model (adapted from Rathnayaka et. al, 2011) 
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  This current work is an extension of probabilistic risk assessment that previously 
focused on unintended or safety incidents. These events could be categorized as natural 
events, as they are expected to happen without the interference of human occupancy. 
Security incidents are characterized as intentional or unnatural events. The reason for this 
simply is that these incidents would not occur unless there is human interaction with the 
process. Security related accidents can stem from two main sources, internal or external. 
The American Petroleum Institute (API) recognizes three main threats to a chemical 
processing facility, which are (API 2003): 
 Internal 
 External 
 Internal working with an external 
Baybutt and Reddy (2003) indicate that an internal threat can come from either current or 
former employees or contractors. These threats frequently are intended to inflict 
economic damage through disruption of the process. An external threat however has a 
much more serious purpose with intentions to inflict casualties rather than economic 
damages. However, the most serious circumstance is the combination of an internal and 
external threat. With an inside knowledge of the facility, a terrorist group or criminal 
could extort a weakness and cause a major catastrophe.  
Chemical sites are major targets for criminals and terrorists because of their 
hazardous materials and operating conditions. These sites are already at risk with natural 
events and the chance of an intentional act only increases the likelihood of incident to 
occur. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, companies have begun to 
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include security in their overall site risk assessment. The security culture first began to 
change with new releases of security guidelines for the chemical industry. One such 
document, from the American Chemistry Council (ACC 2001) discussed risk assessment, 
prevention strategies, management issues and physical security for a chemical site. An 
additional document was released by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS 
2003), which introduced the idea of rings of protection that are shown in Figure 1-3, 
along with appropriate security countermeasures. 
 
Figure 1 - 3: Rings of Protection from CCPS (2003) 
Later, Bajpai and Gupta (2005) completed a work intended to combine these 
guidelines and develop a security methodology for the chemical process industries. The 
first step is to complete a threat analysis (TA). The main purpose of this is to recognize or 
identify any threats that are plausible at a certain plant. Next, a vulnerability analysis 
(VA) is completed to pair a target asset with a threat to determine its vulnerability. 
Simultaneously, existing security measures are evaluated to determine their overall 
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effectiveness. Additionally, the vulnerabilities should be ranked based on attractiveness 
and consequence. At this stage, the authors add a security risk factor table (SRFT) to 
assess the current risk of a facility. With the security risks known, countermeasures can 
then be implemented to stop and/or neutralize an attack. The final step is the mitigation 
and emergency response. The purpose of this step is to finalize an emergency plan when 
an attack occurs and to ensure the proper authorities will assist in response to the attack. 
To exemplify this approach, the authors complete a case study of a typical plant and give 
security recommendations based on the results.  
Bajpai and Gupta (2007) further use this and apply it to typical oil and gas 
infrastructure, a refinery. Through the qualitative analysis, the overall risk was able to be 
determined and thus appropriate recommendations and countermeasures were made 
which could further increase the security of the refinery. The proposed methodology and 
use of the security risk factor table (SRFT) could further be improved if the SRFT was 
completed at each of the various ‘zones’ to provide a more accurate holistic view of 
security. With each zone defined, it would be easier to see where improvements could be 
made.  
In order to help the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop a 
standard SVA, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) in conjunction 
with AcuTech Consulting Group collaborated to develop Risk Analysis and Management 
for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) (Moore et. al 2006). Moore et. al (2006) 
describe RAMCAP as a common method for conducting SVAs for owner and operators 
and in addition help to report vital information on risk to the DHS. The RAMCAP 
method is a qualitative approach because the US chemical industry did not have enough 
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experience with terrorist attacks to be able to use quantitative methodology to accurately 
predict an attack. The first step in the RAMCAP method was screening, which was to 
determine an asset list that would be of interest to the DHS. Its purpose is to determine if 
the RAMCAP SVA would need to be completed and submitted to the DHS. 
The RAMCAP SVA approach consists of seven components of analysis. The first 
step is asset characterization, which helps to identify the notable assets of a chemical 
facility. The remaining analysis is only completed on the noted critical assets. Therefore, 
the next step, threat characterization is used to seek how an attack can be completed 
against the critical asset. Following this, a consequence analysis is conducted to 
determine the worst possible outcomes that could be produced from the threat 
characterization. A vulnerability analysis is then completed to establish the strengths and 
weaknesses of the asset. Then, there are two threat assessments completed one by the 
owner and one by the government. This is done to determine the attractiveness of an 
attack for that particular facility. The final two steps are risk assessment and risk 
management. Risk assessment will help to create strategies to protect the assets against an 
attack and risk management will ensure that risk is kept a standard level for a suitable 
cost.  
In 2013, Moore (AcuTech Consulting) worked in conjunction with the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Petroleum Institute (API) to release a 
Security Risk Assessment (SRA) Methodology (Standard 780) which would be used as a 
security standard for the petroleum industries (Moore, 2013). Moore (2013) states the 
purpose of the SRA is to estimate the chance of a threat against a chemical facility that 
would result in an unwanted consequence. This new ANSI/API Standard 780 is designed 
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to provide the petroleum industry with a holistic SRA. This methodology illustrates that 
the security risk is the likelihood of a successful act against a chemical facility while 
assuming both the likelihood of the act happening and the chance for success causing a 
set of consequences. In order to decrease this risk, there are five inter related steps. The 
first step is characterization of critical assets followed by the threat assessment to identify 
attackers and the attractiveness of an attack. Subsequently, a vulnerability assessment is 
carried out to estimate the likelihood of the various scenarios. The fourth step is the risk 
evaluation to determine any weaknesses of the critical assets. Finally, risk treatment is 
completed to establish security countermeasures. The goal of this methodology is to 
highlight areas of improvement for management and to better define an organizations risk 
tolerance and requirements.  
The current work aims to apply the existing safety barrier method to the security 
aspect of a chemical facility. Using the probabilistic risk approach, this work intends to 
provide a holistic view of security risk analysis, which can be applied to all chemical 
industries. In discussing probabilistic risk assessment, Bayesian Network relaxation 
assumptions will also be explored. Following this, in Section 3, the security barrier model 
using fault and event trees will be discussed. In Section 4, data sources will be 
investigated as there is a current availability for failure events. A case study will be 
presented in Section 5 to outline the application of the proposed methodology. The final 
section will be devoted to the conclusions drawn in this paper. 
1.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
 Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) have been widely used in recent years in a 
safety aspect to help plant managers make informed risk management decisions. One of 
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the highlights of this work is to transition a safety barrier approach method into a security 
barrier approach. As shown in the previous section, most work in security risk analysis is 
qualitative and lacks any quantitative methods. PRA is an organized approach to examine 
highly complex systems that exist in various industries. In its simplest terms, the PRA 
determines the risk value which is the product of consequence and probability. The main 
result of the PRA, as described by Modarres (2008) is finding out the system elements 
that contribute the greatest amount of risk to the system along with the usefulness of 
various risk reduction strategies. In this work, fault and event tree analysis is first utilized 
to develop a base case scenario. With the base case built, the fault trees are then 
subsequently mapped into Bayesian Networks (BN). Furthermore, various relaxation 
assumptions have been applied to the developed BNs in order to show which case best 
reflects reality. As uncertainties may arise through calculation, a Bayesian updating 
mechanism has been added to improve the accuracy of quantification along with a 
predictive component to further develop existing security strategies.  
 Fault tree analysis is the most widely used approach when determining the failure 
probability of barrier (or system). The system is defined by its top event while the tree is 
composed of other systems and events. These smaller sub systems and events are then 
combined with various Boolean logic gates that will cause the top event. Probabilities are 
then assigned to the basic events through historical data or expert judgment. Event tree 
analysis is used to show which sequence of events can lead to which consequences. Each 
barrier (system) is assumed to be independent with each branch representing a success or 
failure. The subsequent barrier is activated when the current barrier fails. The failure 
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probabilities of each barrier when used in an event tree give the occurrence probabilities 
of the various consequences. 
Mapping fault trees into BNs is a simple process that is best described by Bobbi et 
al (1999). When considering a fault tree with simple AND/OR gates (such as the fault 
trees proposed), the basic component of the fault tree (leaf node) now represents a root 
node in a BN. Subsequently, each gate of a fault becomes a BN node and should be 
labeled appropriately. Similar to that of a fault tree, the connections between a node and 
its gate will remain the same. These connections are described as arcs between nodes. 
The arc originates at the ‘parent’ node and ends at the ‘child’ node.  This process is 
illustrated in Figure 1-4 below. 
 
Figure 1 - 4: Mapping Flowchart (Khakzad et al. 2012) 
However, a major difference is for each gate turned into a node, the conditional 
probability table (CPT) must match the logic of the gate (i.e. OR gate). This is an 
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important factor as now the CPT can be manipulated based on various relaxation 
assumptions. With the CPT logic defined, the BN node probability can be calculated 
through the following Eq. 1-1 (Díez and Druzdzel 2007) : 
 𝑃[𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛] = ∏ 𝑃[𝑋𝑖|𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑋𝑖)]
𝑛
𝑖=1            (1-1) 
An example of this mapping technique is shown in a later section of this paper.   
As stated above, a key aspect of utilizing a BN over a fault and event tree analysis 
is the ability to manipulate the CPT. This paper outlines three techniques that can be 
applied to CPT. These techniques are called Leaky-OR, Noisy-OR, and Noisy-AND are 
covered in great detail by Díez and Druzdzel (2007) but will be briefly outlined here. The 
first relaxation assumption discussed is the Noisy-OR, where the term ‘noisy’ references 
the chance that the event may not occur because it was inhibited by an external 
independent factor. Simply, a parent node can occur /be present but the child node was 
not produced due to an inhibitor preventing it. This probability, denoted as ci, is the 
probability that the parent produces the child while qi is the probability that the inhibitor 
is active. This relationship is shown in Eq. 1-2, 
 𝑐𝑖 = 1 −  𝑞𝑖              (1-2)
 When there are multiple parents to a child node, the child probability can then be 
calculated through the following Eq. 1-3: 
 𝑃(𝑍|𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛) =  ∏ (1 − 𝑐𝑖) =  ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑖∈𝑥𝑖∈𝑥          (3-1) 
In the case of a Leaky-OR, a new variable is introduced to account parameters not in the 
model. As it is nearly impossible to include all causes of a certain effect, the leaky 
parameter (cL) can account for it. The Noisy-OR is actually a particular case of the 
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Leaky-OR where its leaky parameter is equal to zero. Thus the equation to calculate the 
probability of the leak parameter is shown below in Eq. 1-4: 
 𝑃(𝑍|𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛) = (1 −  𝑐𝐿) × ∏ (1 − 𝑐𝑖)𝑖∈𝑥         (1-4) 
The last relaxation assumption that will be explored is the Noisy-AND. As Díez and 
Druzdzel explain, each condition of a child node can be either inhibited or substituted. 
Similar to Boolean logic, all parent nodes are required in order for the child node to be 
true. Noisy-AND introduces a new probability, si, which accounts for the parent node 
when it is not present. Hence, a parent node in a Noisy-AND model can either contribute 
an inhibitor or substituted factor based off whether it is present or not.  The appropriate 
Eq. 1-5 for this model is shown below: 
 𝑃(𝑍|𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛) = ∏ 𝑐𝑖𝑖∈𝑥 × ∏ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝑥           (1-5) 
Based on prior and precursor data, an important feature of the proposed model is 
the ability to predict the number of abnormal security events. This prediction will be both 
qualitative and quantitative in order to best provide information to help improve a 
chemical plant’s security strategies. The predictive model will follow a similar approach 
used in Rathnayaka et al. (2011) to help determine the number of events in the next time 
interval.  
Hamada et al. (2008) proposed a general predictive Eq. 1-6 for discrete random 
variable z, based on observed data where the unknown parameter is symbolized by θ, the 
posterior distribution by p(θ/π), and the sampling distribution by p(z/θ) where π is the 
data in the posterior distribution.  
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 𝑝(𝑧 𝜋) =  ∑ 𝑝(𝑧 𝜃⁄ )𝑝(𝜃 𝜋)⁄𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝜃⁄            (1-6) 
Eq. 6 is now reestablished into Eq. 1-7 to determine the number of abnormal events 
where the posterior distribution now becomes p(λ/data) and the sampling distribution is 
p(yt+1/λ). The average number of abnormal events is now represented by the variable λ.  
 𝑝 (
𝑦𝑡+1
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
) =  ∑ 𝑝 (
𝑦𝑡+1
𝜆
) 𝑝 (
𝜆
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
)𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝜃            (1-7) 
Rathnayaka (2011) points out that in the above equation, data is equal to the number of 
observed abnormal events during the time interval t, and the gamma distribution is the 
most widely used prior distribution for λ. Eq. 1-8 below represents the gamma 
distribution probability density with the parameters α and β.  
 𝑝 (
𝜆
𝛼,𝛽
) =  
𝛽𝛼
𝛤𝛼
𝜆𝛼−1𝑒−𝛽𝜆            (1-8) 
The number of abnormal events is to be considered a discrete and independent variable 
which follows a Poisson distribution with rate λ. In this assumption, the likelihood 
distribution for data (y1, … yn) is illustrated in Eq. 1-9: 
𝑝 (
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
𝜆
) = 𝜆
∑ 𝑦𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=0 𝑒
−𝑛𝜆
∏(𝑦𝑛!)
            (1-9) 
Through the conjugate property, the posterior distribution will also follow the gamma 
distribution except its parameters 𝛼𝑝 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝑦𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=0   and 𝛽𝑝 =  𝛼 + 𝑛. The total number 
of abnormal events is the summation of all the events over all of the time intervals. In Eq. 
1-10, an updated value of λ can be found from the mean value of the posterior 
distribution.  
 𝜆𝑝 = 𝐸 (
𝜆
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
) =
𝛼+∑ 𝑦𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝛼+𝛽
         (1-10) 
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In summary, Eq. 1-11 can determine the predictive probability distribution of occurrence 
for an abnormal event in the next time interval based on data through an approximated 
Poisson process.  
 𝑝 (
𝑦𝑡+1
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
) =  
𝜆𝑝
𝑦𝑡+1𝑒𝜆𝑝
𝑦𝑡+1!
          (1-11) 
Through quantification of the fault and event tree analysis, there is room for 
uncertainty to grow or for the accuracy of the consequence probabilities to decrease. This 
can arise by using point value form probabilities in addition to the error that may arise by 
using expert judgment or in literature. Therefore, a Bayesian updating mechanism is 
utilized to reduce the uncertainty that can occur. Bayes’ theorem allows for initial beliefs 
to be updated through the use of likelihood probabilities from newly observed data. 
Similar to the predictive modeling approach, this probability updating method will very 
closely follow Rathnayaka et al (2011). This updated probability can be calculated by Eq. 
1-12 where the denominator represents a normalizing factor:  
 𝑝 (
𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
) =
𝑝(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑥𝑖)𝑝(𝑥𝑖)⁄
∑ 𝑝(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑥𝑖)𝑝(𝑥𝑖)⁄
          (1-12) 
The prior probability is defined by p(xi) calculated through fault tree analysis and the 
likelihood is represented by p(data/xi) is calculated from abnormal event data. The first 
step in the likelihood calculation is to determine the number of abnormal events for each 
month and the relative success and failures of each barrier. In Eq. 1-13, NF,i and NS,i 
represent the number of failures and success at each barrier, respectively.  
 𝑝 (
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
𝑥𝑖
) =
𝑁𝐹,𝑖
𝑁𝐹,𝑖+𝑁𝑆,𝑖
           (1-13) 
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With the likelihood probabilities estimated and prior probabilities known, each can be 
placed into Eq. 12 to determine the new posterior probability. Finally, Eq. 1-14 can be 
used in event tree analysis to update the occurrence probabilities of the accident denoted 
by p(ck/data).   
 𝑝 (
𝑐𝑘
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
) =  ∏ (
𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
)
𝜃𝑖,𝑘
(1 − (
𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
))
1−𝜃𝑖,𝑘
𝑖=𝑆𝐵𝑘 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5     (1-14) 
1.3 Model Presentation 
Previous security methods have been based on qualitative analysis. An attack is 
the result of an intentional act to cause harm. In its worst-case form (act of terrorism) it 
can cause consequential damage to not only human life but economic and environmental 
as well. The problem with attempting to model an attack is that it can happen in any 
number of ways and therefore the best countermeasure is to define security measures that 
can prevent them. Security measures can range in difficulty and thus the more 
sophisticated security system in place, the less likely an intentional failure can be 
accomplished. There are however two elements that can influence the attack process at 
any time, the Management and Organization barrier and the Political barrier. The 
relationship of all the barriers is shown in Figure 1-5.  
 
Figure 1 - 5: The Attack Model 
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The cause-consequence relationship is represented with fault and event tree 
analysis. In fault tree analysis (FTA), the top event signifies a failure for the entire 
barrier. Each top event will fail when the associated sub element barriers fail. The first 
four barriers (external, internal, interior, and critical) all have similar sub elements. 
Reniers (2010) proposed that physical security measures should be based on structural, 
electronic, a personnel barrier (or security checkpoint in case of external), which is 
implemented in this model. Even though the plant has been separated into barriers or 
zones, each measure is likely to overlap with another barrier. This however is not 
considered in this model. It is assumed that each barrier is a stand-alone entity and does 
not interact with each other.  
 The function of the external security barrier is to provide the first line of defense 
against an attack. Structural countermeasures for a chemical plant can be a perimeter 
fence, entrance/exit gates, bollards, and trenches. The electronic barrier is divided into 
power and intrusion detection devices because if the power is lost to the plant then the 
electronic barrier has failed. The intrusion devices are line of sight sensors, video motion 
and lighting. The final sub element of the external barrier is the personnel barrier. This 
barrier acts a security checkpoint in order to gain entrance into the chemical facility. At a 
security checkpoint there is a bag check, personal inspection (may be completed through 
image technology), vehicle inspection, and appropriate documentation for employees or 
contractors. The proposed fault tree for this barrier is shown below in Figure 1-6. 
Subsequent failure of this fault will allow access on the chemical facility’s grounds.  
 The purpose of the internal security barrier is to prevent an adversary from 
gaining access to structural buildings that are on the chemical plant property. The 
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structural barrier is broken down into road conditions, manual locked doors and manual 
locked windows. Road conditions is a security measure that can often be overlooked. For 
instance, a well paved and maintained road will make moving around a chemical plant 
much easier for an attacker. Similar to the external barrier, the internal security electronic 
barrier is divided into power and intrusion devices. However, it adds a badge swipe 
component which will have the ability to electronically unlock doors. The personnel 
barrier includes both a reception area that can be a check-in desk past the security 
checkpoint and a mobile security unit. This unit would be tasked with making routine 
rounds throughout the plant. The fault tree for this security barrier is shown in Figure 1-7.  
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Figure 1 - 6: Proposed External Security Barrier Fault Tree 
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Figure 1 - 7: Proposed Internal Security Barrier Fault Tree 
 Following is the interior security barrier, which would deter unauthorized 
personnel from gaining access to employee workstations and offices. For the interior 
structural barrier, limiting the access points and having manual locked doors can deter an 
attacker. In addition, the electronic barrier includes biometric access and boundary 
penetration devices. These devices would detect when someone has gained unauthorized 
entry. However, the effectiveness of the personnel barrier is a function of the vigilance of 
the employees of the facility. Employees must be aware when unauthorized personnel are 
on site and should take notice of visitors. The interior security fault tree is shown in 
Figure 1-8.  
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Figure 1 - 8: Proposed Interior Security Barrier Fault Tree 
The critical security barrier is to prevent unwanted individuals from accessing the 
chemical plants control room. Similar to the interior barrier, the structural barrier consists 
of limited access points and manual locked doors. But in the electronic barrier, a firewall 
element has been added. The firewall is to prohibit unauthorized users from gaining 
proprietary information or manipulation of the process controls. Additionally, the 
personnel barrier should restrict visitor access to this security point. A proposed fault tree 
for this barrier is displayed in Figure 1-9. 
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Figure 1 - 9: Proposed Critical Security Barrier Fault Tree 
 The last security barrier and last line of defense is the fail-safe security barrier. 
This barrier is separated into two categories of fail-safe mechanisms, manual and 
electronic. These mechanisms can come from an alarm or a shutdown. The alarm has the 
ability to warn employees of the unsafe conditions that the processing plant is incurring. 
Meanwhile the shutdown will end operations in order to revert back safe working 
conditions. The fault tree for this security barrier is represented in Figure 1-10.  
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Figure 1 - 10: Proposed Fail-Safe Security Barrier Fault Tree 
 In regards to the above stated security barriers, each barrier’s effectiveness will 
depend on the devices and security measures that are utilized. However, making 
economic and cost efficient selection for devices is imperative. For instance, it would be 
ideal to have biometric access at each door in order to ensure maximum security but the 
cost to supply this for an entire chemical facility is not feasible. Therefore, management 
should take the appropriate and practical actions to guarantee each security barrier is well 
equipped.  
 The management and organization barrier has the ability for its sub elements to 
intervene at any stage during an attack. This barrier is difficult to portray as each industry 
and individual companies will have various standards and protocols. Nevertheless, 
important factors were determined and a fault tree was designed as shown in Figure 1-11.  
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Figure 1 - 11: Proposed Management and Organization Security Barrier Fault Tree 
The most important barrier in the model is the political barrier. This barrier takes 
into account the on-going situations around the chemical facility itself. Three main sub-
barriers have been developed which are laws and enforcement, crime, and terrorism. The 
crime sub element is separated into hostage situations, stealing, and armed attack 
instances. There are five types of terrorism that would consider using a chemical plant as 
a target. Grothaus (2014) describes these types of terrorism as follows: 
 State – government use of terror to regulate its population 
 Religious – individual or groups use ideologies to justify use of terror 
 Pathological – individual or groups that use terror for personal enjoyment 
 Issue-Orientated – individual or groups inflict terror to bring awareness to a 
certain problem 
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 Separatist – a group that wishes to get rid of the current government and create a 
new state. 
The laws and enforcement barrier is relative to the country or region as it looks at the 
measures in place to protect both the workers and the operation of the chemical facility. 
This fault tree is shown in Figure 1-12.   
 
Figure 1 - 12: Proposed Political Security Barrier Fault Tree 
 In order to determine the consequences of the possible outcomes for an attack on 
a chemical plant, event tree analysis is applied in conjunction with an event network. The 
event tree is shown in Figure 1-13.  
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Figure 1 - 13: Attack Sequence Event Tree 
Currently available literature does not provide definitions for security analysis 
consequences. Therefore, descriptions have been developed to accurately depict these 
security related events.  
 A ‘near miss’ is described as an event that has potential to cause damage or loss 
but does not result in any harm. An illustration of this would be a chemical facility 
receiving a threat of intent to inflict harm and they notify the proper authorities to prevent 
the action from being executed.  
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 An ‘incident’ can be defined as an event that can cause minor damage to chemical 
facility and loss of production is negligible. For example, an intrusion device alerts 
security personnel that unauthorized individuals have cut the chain link fence and are 
currently trespassing on the grounds of the plant. 
 A ‘light attack’ is an event that could cause major damage to a chemical facility 
with minor loss in production and some harm against employees. One scenario for this 
case is if an individual breaks onto the processing plant grounds causes a leak in a storage 
tank and breaks a door down in attempt to gain access to sensitive information.  
 An event where a ‘considerable attack’ occurs would inflict injury to workers, 
cause greater financial damage and potential loss in production. In addition, this type of 
attack would draw local news coverage.  
 A ‘severe attack’ can be described as an event that may have one or more 
employee fatalities, major damage done to the environment and create national news. In 
addition there would be excessive financial losses and production would be stopped.  
 A ‘devastating attack’ is an event or series of events that would cause multiple 
fatalities, reach international news, and there would be catastrophic financial losses. 
Furthermore, the facility may be closed down for a lengthy period of time. An example of 
this is the recent attack on In Amenas gas refinery. 
With the model herein outlined, the next step is to map the above fault trees into 
Bayesian networks. Shown in Figure 1-14, is an example of one of the barriers (external). 
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Figure 1 - 14: External Barrier Mapped in a Bayesian Network 
The importance of this mapping is to verify the fault tree calculation by matching the 
conditional probability table (CPT) with the logic of the fault tree. In addition, using a 
BN allows for manipulation of the CPT to reflect various relaxation assumptions which 
will be shown in the case study. The next section will look into developing probability 
data that can be utilized for this proposed model.  
1.4 Data Sources 
When developing a risk model, uncertainties are created when assumptions are 
made. However, by comparing results of different models with different assumptions the 
critical components of failure can be recognized. This recognition is more useful than 
employing data sources as it displays an understanding of the risk model and its key 
components. Although only one case study is completed in this paper, the model is 
devised in such a way that it can be applied to multiple scenarios to develop a deeper 
understanding. The initial probabilities were developed through expert judgment, as there 
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is currently a lack of data found in both industry and literature. To minimize the 
uncertainty that comes with expert judgment assigning probabilities, a soft computing 
theory has been utilized to help develop such probabilities.  
In order to determine the failure probabilities of each basic event it must first be 
separated into two categories. The reason for this is shown in Figure 1-15. An event can 
come to failure through either a natural failure (i.e. component failure) or an unnatural 
(forced) failure. If natural failure data is available for the event described, such as 
biometric access, then it is sorted into category 2. Otherwise, it is given category 1 in 
which a probability is directly assigned based on expert judgment, as it cannot have a 
natural failure. 
 
Figure 1 - 15: Basic Event Failure Pathways 
Currently, forced failure data is unavailable and thus the unnatural failure must be 
calculated through Bayes Theorem shown in Eq. 1-15: 
𝑃(𝐸|𝑇) =
𝑃(𝑇|𝐸)×𝑃(𝐸) 
𝑃(𝑇)
          (1-15) 
Where P(E) denotes the probability of  an event due to intended and unintended causes, 
P(T) is the probability of a threat, and P(T|E) is assuming the failure of the event E, what 
is the probability it came from a threat. As this is difficult to calculate, soft computing 
theory is utilized. Each event likelihood is given a specific term, which has an associated 
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probability range, devised by the authors. These probability ranges were developed by the 
authors and is presented in Table 1-1.  
Table 1 - 1: Likelihood Terms and Associated Probability Range 
Event Likelihood Term Probability Range 
Very Likely  > 0.5  
Frequent 0.25 - 0.50 
Probable 0.10 - 0.25 
Unlikely 0.01 - 0.10 
Remote .001 - .01 
Rare .0001 - .001 
Improbable < .0001 
 
The key aspect in this is determining the probability of threat for a given chemical plant. 
This may lay in the location and conditions outside surrounding plant. To show how this 
method can be effectively used, a case study is presented in the subsequent section. 
1.5 Case Study 
A typical refinery is located in a region with turmoil and a recent uprising against 
foreign oil producers as the country is only a few years past a civil war. A neighboring 
country is currently dealing with civil demonstrations. However, a chemical plant has just 
been attacked by armed separatist group. The refinery, as shown in Figure 1-15, is located 
approximately 100km from the nearest town and 20km from the closest village. Due to its 
location, the refinery has its own power generation plant and it has been determined that a 
threat against the plant is unlikely. 
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Figure 1 - 16: Case Study Refinery Layout 
 Recently, the management conducted a qualitative security vulnerability 
assessment to ensure that facility was up to date. With the current events in mind, 
management has decided to use the proposed quantitative analysis to determine the 
occurrence probability of various consequences. Management has a high concern for its 
control room shown in Figure 1-17.  
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Figure 1 - 17: Case Study Control Building Layout 
 Using the proposed model, probabilities for each basic event were assigned. The 
values tabulated in Tables 1-2 through 1-8 are assigned by expert judgement for the 
purpose of illustration of the described methodology. 
Table 1 - 2: Basic event failure probability for External Security Barrier 
Event Description Failure Probability  
Perimeter Fence 9.044E-03 
Entrance/Exit Gates 2.276E-02 
Bollards 3.126E-02 
Trenches 4.044E-03 
Power 1.685E-02 
Line of Sight Sensor 7.814E-03 
Video Motion 5.373E-03 
Lighting 9.386E-03 
Bag Check 3.894E-03 
Person Inspection (Patdown) 1.184E-02 
Vehicle Inspection 9.060E-03 
Documentation 5.953E-03 
 
Table 1 - 3: Basic event failure probability for Internal Security Barrier 
Event Description Failure Probability 
Road Conditions 7.700E-04 
Manual Locked Doors 1.784E-02 
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Manual Locked Windows 4.162E-02 
Electronic Doors Lock 1.137E-02 
Power 4.012E-03 
Line of Sight Sensor 1.429E-02 
Video Motion 1.573E-03 
Lighting 8.719E-03 
Reception 2.200E-03 
Mobile Security 1.092E-02 
 
Table 1 - 4: Basic event failure probability for Interior Security Barrier 
Event Description Failure Probability 
Limited Access Points 7.800E-03 
Manual Locked Doors 1.061E-02 
Electronic Doors Lock 5.366E-03 
Power 9.137E-03 
Line of Sight Sensor 1.786E-03 
Video Motion 8.164E-03 
Lighting 9.098E-03 
Visitor Escort 5.600E-04 
Employee Awareness 5.300E-04 
 
Table 1 - 5: Basic event failure probability for Critical Security Barrier 
Event Description Failure Probability 
Limited Access Points 6.100E-04 
Manual Locked Doors 9.845E-04 
Biometric Access 3.240E-04 
Power 4.581E-04 
Line of Sight Sensor 2.100E-04 
Video Motion 5.164E-04 
Network Firewall 7.202E-04 
Visitor Restriction 5.900E-04 
Employee Awareness 9.000E-04 
 
Table 1 - 6: Basic event failure probability for Fail-Safe Security Barrier 
Event Description Failure Probability 
Manual Shutdown 3.267E-05 
Manual Alarm 1.953E-05 
Electronic Shutdown 5.082E-05 
Electronic Alarm 8.215E-05 
 
Table 1 - 7: Basic event failure probability for Management and Organization Barrier 
Event Description Failure Probability 
Inadequate Security Program 3.800E-04 
Inadequate Communication 4.200E-04 
Inadequate Staff & Resources 2.700E-04 
Inadequate Planning 4.800E-04 
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Poor Communication 9.800E-04 
Inefficient Management Behaviors 7.400E-04 
Inadequate Security Practice 3.600E-04 
 
Table 1 - 8: Basic event failure probability for Political Barrier 
Event Description Failure Probability 
State 8.800E-04 
Religious 6.200E-04 
Pathological 8.000E-05 
Issue-Orientated 2.100E-04 
Separatist 8.100E-04 
Hostage 7.500E-04 
Stealing 8.500E-03 
Armed Attacks 7.100E-03 
Protecting Workers 5.500E-03 
Protecting Operations 3.800E-03 
Worker Protection 3.800E-03 
Operation Protection 6.800E-03 
 
Using a fault tree simulation, the results for each barrier are shown in Table 1-9. With 
each barrier solved, the associated event tree model can be solved to determine the 
occurrence probability of each consequence. These results are shown in Table 1-10 
additionally with the mapped Bayesian Network. Each consequence was developed 
through attack scenarios, their causes and their respective severity levels. As shown the 
model uses fault tree analysis in a barrier approach to determine the likelihood of each 
event. The probability for a chemical facility to remain ‘safe’ based on the event tree is 
0.8344. This number needs to be increased. Furthermore, the probability for a ‘near miss’ 
is 0.1135, which is relatively high and should be lowered. This could be achieved by 
improving the security countermeasures in both the internal and external security barriers. 
However, the political barrier plays a major role in affecting the overall plant security and 
will be a major factor in the security of the plant. 
Table 1 - 9: Failure probability data for each security barrier 
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Security Barrier Failure Probability 
External 1.2930E-01 
Internal 1.0831E-01 
Interior 5.1874E-02 
Critical 5.3010E-03 
Fail-Safe 6.4227E-04 
Management and Organization 3.6250E-03 
Political 3.8216E-02 
 
Table 1 - 10: Consequence Occurrence Probability 
Consequence Event Tree Occurrence 
Probability 
Event Network Occurrence 
Probability 
Safe 8.3439E-01 8.3439E-01 
Near Miss 1.1352E-01 1.1352E-01 
Incident 4.6402E-02 4.6401E-02 
Light Attack 5.1450E-03 5.1450E-03 
Considerable Attack 5.0608E-04 5.1366E-04 
Severe Attack 2.8001E-05 2.7630E-05 
Devastating Attack 1.5000E-09 1.5000E-07 
SUM: 9.999941E-01 1 
  
It can be seen in Table 1-10 that both the event tree and BN produced the exact 
values except for the last three consequences. In addition, the summation of the 
probabilities should equal 1 but for the event tree this does not occur which could be 
assumed to be a computational error by the software. Furthermore, with the mapped BN 
matching in value to the fault tree, the relaxation assumptions can hence be applied.   
 With the Bayesian Network properly mapped, the relaxation assumptions can be 
applied. To display which technique can best reflect reality, each of the techniques will 
be used on the External Barrier as previously shown in Figure 1-13. In this case study, in 
order to seek continuity, the causation probabilities remained the same throughout each 
relaxation technique. Each causation probability was assigned on the basis that the parent 
event could cause the child event to fail when it was present. In the Leaky-OR 
assumption, a probability of 0.01 was assigned. This probability accounts for 1% of those 
parameters that are not modeled or unaccounted for. Meanwhile the substitution 
43 
 
probability was assigned to be 0.05 as this probability when the parent node is not 
present. For the External Barrier, these probabilities are shown in Table 1-11. 
Table 1 - 11: Assigned Relaxation Assumption Probabilities for each parent event 
Barrier Parameter Causation 
Probability 
Leak 
Probability 
Substitution 
Probability 
Intrusion 
Device 
Line of Sight Sensor 0.60 0.01 0.05 
Lighting 0.80 
Video Motion Sensor 0.70 
Electronic Intrusion Device 0.70 0.01 0.05 
Power 0.80 
Structural Perimeter Fence 0.80 0.01 0.05 
Entrance/Exit Gates 0.60 
Bollards 0.70 
Trenches 0.30 
Personnel Bag Check 0.40 0.01 0.05 
Patdown 0.30 
Vehicle Inspection 0.80 
Documentation 0.75 
External Electronic 0.85 0.01 0.05 
Structural 0.70 
Personnel 0.60 
 
Using available software called Netica (https://www.norsys.com/netica.html), these 
probabilities were calculated through the outlined equations in Section 2. Thus, in Table 
1-12, each of the failure probabilities are shown using the various techniques.  
Table 1 - 12: Relaxation Techniques Failure Probabilities 
Barrier Mapped BN Noisy-OR Leaky-OR Noisy-AND 
Intrusion Device 0.021 0.015 0.025 0.024 
Electronic  0.037 0.024 0.040 0.064 
Structural 0.066 0.043 0.053 0.018 
Personnel 0.030 0.017 0.027 0.021 
External 0.128 0.062 0.096 0.023 
 
Through the above table, it can be shown that the Leaky Noisy-OR relaxation assumption 
has the highest failure probability and the Noisy-AND has the lowest barrier failure 
probability based on the External barrier. The reasoning behind is that, the Noisy-AND 
requires a combination of parameters to have a failure while the Noisy-OR only needs 
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one parameter. The leak probability adds complexity to the Noisy-OR, which further 
increases the probability of a barrier failure. However, it should be noted there are a few 
instances where the Noisy-And does not provide the lowest failure probability. This can 
be attributed to how the causation probabilities of the parent nodes interact with each 
other.  
 Nonetheless, the relaxation assumption that would most reflect reality and should 
be utilized is the Noisy-AND. The main reason for this is because an attacker on a 
chemical plant would likely attempt to break in through multiple ways. Using the Noisy-
OR is expecting an attacker to only attack one avenue in the barrier. But in reality it can 
be assumed that there will be back-up plans, multiple personnel and access routes used to 
increase the likelihood of success.  
One of the key aspects of this model is its ability to update and predict. 
Employing the approach used in Rathnayaka (2011), the number of cumulative abnormal 
events is displayed in Table 1-13. Assuming that the gamma distribution parameters are 
both uniform, α and β have the respective value of 0.01. Therefore, using Eq. (10), it was 
determined that the mean value for abnormal events λp was estimated to be 0.916. With 
this estimation placed into the predictive model, for the 13 month the average number of 
abnormal events was approximately 1.  
Table 1 - 13: Cumulative Number of Abnormal Events over last 12 months 
Month Safe Near 
Miss 
Incident Light 
Attack 
Considerable 
Attack 
Severe 
Attack 
Devastating 
Attack 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 
4 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 
5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 
6 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 
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7 4 2 2 1 0 0 0 
8 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 
9 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 
10 8 3 3 1 0 0 0 
11 9 4 3 1 0 0 0 
12 10 5 3 1 0 0 0 
 
The final step in the proposed model is to update the barrier probabilities, as there is 
uncertainty with the initial probabilities since they were derived from expert judgment. A 
Bayesian mechanism is used to update the failure probabilities based on the fault trees 
and thus the consequence occurrence probabilities based on the event tree. The first step 
is to develop the likelihood probabilities based on the cumulative number of events 
shown in Table 1-13.  Utilizing Eq. (13), these probabilities are shown in Table 1-14. 
Subsequently, applying the Eq. (12) based on Table 1-10 (prior) and Table 1-14 
(likelihood), the posterior probabilities for each barrier could be estimated. These values 
are displayed in Table 1-15.  
Table 1 - 14: Barrier Likelihood Probabilities 
Month External Internal Interior Critical M&O Political 
1 0.000 - - - - - 
2 0.333 0.000 - - - - 
3 0.400 0.500 0.000 - - - 
4 0.400 0.500 0.000 - - - 
5 0.500 0.333 0.000 - - - 
6 0.500 0.333 0.000 - - - 
7 0.556 0.600 0.333 0.000 - - 
8 0.600 0.500 0.333 0.000 - - 
9 0.545 0.500 0.333 0.000 - - 
10 0.467 0.571 0.250 0.000 - - 
11 0.471 0.500 0.250 0.000 - - 
12 0.474 0.444 0.250 0.000 - - 
 Table 1 - 15: Barrier Posterior Probabilities 
Month External Internal Interior Critical M & O Political 
1 0.000 - - - - - 
2 0.065 0.000 - - - - 
3 0.086 0.108 0.000 - - - 
4 0.086 0.108 0.000 - - - 
5 0.129 0.054 0.000 - - - 
6 0.129 0.054 0.000 - - - 
7 0.162 0.162 0.026 0.000 - - 
8 0.194 0.108 0.026 0.000 - - 
9 0.155 0.108 0.026 0.000 - - 
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10 0.113 0.144 0.017 0.000 - - 
11 0.115 0.108 0.017 0.000 - - 
12 0.116 0.087 0.017 0.000 - - 
 
With each the barrier posterior probabilities estimated, the consequence occurrence 
probabilities can be evaluated. These values are displayed in both Figure 1-18 and Figure 
1-19.  
 
Figure 1 - 18: Updated Consequence Probability for Safe and Near Miss 
 
Figure 1 - 19: Updated Consequence Probability for Incident and Light Attack 
Referring back to Table 9, both the external and internal barriers have high failure 
probabilities when compared to the rest. Even with the probabilities updated, the external 
barrier still remains high when compared to the rest. This clearly shows how important 
the first line of defense is against an impending attack. Therefore, counter measures can 
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be made to further reduce their chance of failure. The recommendations are as follows 
are: 
 Involve military personnel to restrict traffic to refinery business  
 Install guard towers for the perimeter fence and involve security rounds 
along the perimeter 
 Regularly inspect security device to ensure proper working order 
 Develop a relationship with local enforcement to report any suspicious 
activity within range of the refinery 
1.6 Conclusion 
 Through review of available security literature and the application of an existing 
probabilistic safety method, this model has been developed. In this proposed model, 
security barriers are developed in a sequential barrier approach method. Five barriers are 
placed in consecutive order with two barriers common to all of them. The five security 
barriers are: external, internal, interior, critical, and fail-safe, with the two common 
barriers being political, management and organization. The use of fault and event analysis 
has allowed for the barrier failure and consequence occurrence probabilities to be 
calculated. In addition, the fault trees have been mapped into respective Bayesian 
Networks, which allow for relaxation assumptions to be applied that better reflect reality. 
It was found the use of the Noisy-AND technique best reflects reality has an attacker will 
have multiple routes to ensure their attack is successful. This follows the logic for AND 
model has it represents that one condition is observed.  
 Nominally, basic event failure data is generated from reliability databases, 
literature and/or expert judgment. Alas, this is not the case for security related event. As it 
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stands currently, there is a lack of data available related to security failures or forced 
failures. Therefore, soft computing theory in addition to Bayes theorem is used to 
calculate these probabilities. Furthermore, a predictive modeling and updating 
mechanism was applied to the model. This allowed for the model to become dynamic and 
adapt to changes as they happen in real time while the updating mechanism helped to 
reduce the uncertainty that may have been developed when values were assigned.  
 It should be noted that events threatening to a chemical facility are always 
changing and an attack on a plant can happen at any moment. Thus it is the mandate of 
the owners and management to ensure not only the safety of its workers but also others 
who may be affected by an attack.  
The proposed methodology details a comprehensive security analysis and 
provides information to help in the underlying decision making of risk management. The 
goal of this work is to provide a model for quantitative analysis of security site risk and to 
create an awareness of the value of creating a database for security related failures. 
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Chapter 2: SVAPP Methodology: A Predictive Security Vulnerability  
Assessment Modelling Method 
2.0 Abstract 
Recent intentional attacks on the chemical industries in Middle East and Algeria 
have greatly influenced the risk management mindset. Nominally, probabilistic risk 
assessment and management has focused on safety and unintentional acts in the chemical 
and petroleum industry. The focus now needs to be broadened to include intentional acts 
that will inflict damage on a chemical facility. The proposed Security Vulnerability 
Assessment, Prevention and Prediction (SVAPP) methodology utilizes an existing safety 
barrier approach and adapts it to suit the security facet. In total, seven barriers are 
proposed of which five barriers are utilized to prevent or deter an attack with two 
overseeing barriers. The five barriers that help deter the security attack are external, 
internal, interior, critical, and the fail-safe barrier. To reduce the effect of uncertainty in 
the model, a Bayesian updating technique is proposed along with a predictive capability. 
This is a key aspect of the model because; with any new information as it accumulates, 
the model can be updated to better reflect the updated conditions. To illustrate how the 
model can be executed, a case study is conducted on a figurative liquefied natural gas 
treating plant. The goal of this work is to raise awareness for the development of security 
vulnerability assessment related databases in the chemical plants so that they can be used 
for continually updating the much needed probabilistic security vulnerability assessment 
in the prevailing environment.  
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Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, raised the awareness of the need to 
improve chemical facilities risk assessments to counter possible security incidents. 
Chemical plants are possible targets for intentional attacks as they process and store high 
quantities of hazardous materials. A security risk assessment is similar to a safety risk 
assessment as it can help facilitate the mitigation of nuisance value of high frequency-low 
consequence and low frequency-high consequence events. The American Petroleum 
Institute (API) and the American Chemistry Council (ACC) both released documents to 
help processing plants complete risk assessments (API, 2003; ACC, 2001). These 
assessments are formally known as security vulnerability assessments (SVAs).  
Throughout recent years, there have been some notable intentional attacks on 
chemical facilities. On February 24, 2006, there was a failed attack at Abqaiq in Saudi 
Arabia (Henderson, 2006). At the gate of the large refinery, assailants were killed along 
with two guards after a vehicular explosion and a minor skirmish. In January of 2013, 
armed militants attacked the Amenas gas refinery in Algeria and seized hostages that 
lasted over three days (Statoil, 2013). By the end of the third day, there were forty [40] 
casualties among the workers and production was shut down for some time.  The most 
recent terrorist incident involves Iraq's largest refinery, the Baiji refinery. Since June of 
2014, the refinery was under siege with Islamic State and Iraqi forces trading control of 
the facility. As of late December 2014, Islamic State militants had regained control of the 
refinery (Pandey, 2014). These examples substantiate the need to create a proper security 
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risk assessment, prevention, and prediction in order to avoid financial loss, material loss, 
and most importantly avoid human loss.  
2.2 Research Backgrounds 
The security culture slowly began to change in the early 2000s, as a document 
was released by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) (2003). This work 
provided systematic approaches for identifying, analyzing, and managing security 
vulnerabilities. In addition, the document illustrated the 'Rings of Protection' where an 
adapted version is shown in Figure 2-1.  The Outer ring would provide perimeter security 
measures while the Middle may prevent an adversary from gaining further access to more 
critical areas. The Inner ring shall have most sophisticated security measures as it is the 
last line of defense for the critical infrastructure.  In some cases, a security measure may 
have a wide range of applicability and can be utilized in multiple rings. For example, a 
badge check can be used for entrance onto the work site and additionally be required for 
access into a work site office.  
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Figure 2 - 1: Rings of Protection based on Reniers (2010) 
One of the first Security Vulnerability Assessments (SVA) to build up on the 
work provided by the CCPS was Air Products and Chemicals Inc. (APCI) (Dunbobbin et 
al. 2004). The APCI SVA methodology was developed to assist the company in 
conducting a robust approach that could be applied to a wide range of chemical facilities. 
This methodology expands on the CCPS work by documenting the flow of both 
employees and contractors to gain an understanding of people flow. Furthermore, it 
introduces a separate method to conduct an assessment of the current security systems on 
the chemical facility. Gap analysis is also presented to identify further improvements that 
could come through additional security, engineering or operations.  
Bajpai and Gupta (2005) proposed a work that built on the then existing 
guidelines to develop a security methodology for chemical process industry. The initial 
step in the approach was to complete a threat analysis (TA) on a processing facility in 
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order to recognize or identify possible threats. Subsequently, a vulnerability analysis 
(VA) was proposed to pair a potential target asset with a likely threat. They further 
proposed a review of security measures to verify the overall effectiveness. With this 
information, the vulnerabilities can be ranked based on the attractiveness and severity of 
consequence. Next a security risk factor table was created to assess the latest risks of the 
facility and the appropriateness of countermeasures that can be implemented. The final 
step in their work was to finalize a mitigation and emergency response plan that may 
include local authorities. To illustrate this approach, the authors presented a case study 
and gave security recommendations based off of results.  
 Moore et al. (2007) described an approach called Risk Analysis and Management 
for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP). At the behest of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), USA; the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Innovative 
Technologies Institute and AcuTech consulting collaborated to develop sector-specific 
guidance on vulnerability analysis and management for critical asset protection for the 
chemical manufacturing, petroleum refining, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) sectors. 
RAMCAP is a qualitative method to conduct SVAs for either owner or operator of 
chemical facility, while also supplying key information back to the DHS. This 
information is used for a screening process by DHS to get an understanding of the assets 
that are important to protect against terrorist attack and to prioritize the activities. The 
RAMCAP-SVA is broken into seven main steps, where the first step is asset 
characterization. In this step, all non-credible target assets of the chemical facility are 
ignored and only credible targets are analyzed. The next step is threat characterization, 
which is similar to a threat analysis as it seeks information on how an attack can be 
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completed against the critical asset. A consequence analysis is conducted to evaluate the 
worst possible outcomes followed by a vulnerability analysis to establish both the 
strengths and weaknesses of the asset. With this information, both the owner and the 
government will complete a threat assessment in order to determine the overall 
attractiveness for an attack. The final two steps of the RAMCAP-SVA method are risk 
assessment and risk management. The risk assessment helps to create strategies to protect 
the credible assets against an attack while risk management will ensure that risk is kept at 
a standard level for an appropriate cost.  
 Later, Moore (2013) of AcuTech Consulting worked with the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Petroleum Institute (API) to help develop a security 
standard tailored to the petroleum industry. Security Risk Assessment (SRA) 
Methodology 780 (2013) established a tool for an industry to estimate the chance of a 
threat against its chemical plant that would result in any unwanted consequences. Similar 
to the previous work, there are five interrelated steps to complete the SRA. First, an asset 
characterization is done to deem which assets are most critical. Second a threat 
assessment is conducted to identify possible attackers and the attractiveness of an attack, 
which is followed by a vulnerability assessment to calculate the likelihood of the various 
scenarios. Next, a risk evaluation is completed to seek out any weaknesses of the 
identified critical assets. Risk treatment is the final step, which is to establish or improve 
existing security countermeasures.  The main goal for this approach is to assist 
management by better defining organization risk tolerance and requirements. All of these 
steps are qualitative in nature. 
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In the proposed Security Vulnerability Assessment, Prevention and Prediction 
(SVAPP) methodology, the authors improve on the previous work of security 
vulnerability assessments which are mostly qualitative in nature with the work on the 
safety discipline which is quantitative barrier based approach which allows for continual 
updating of likelihood of security attack. A comparison of the above mentioned 
methodologies are illustrated in Table 2-1 below. 
Table 2 - 1: Comparison of Security Methodologies 
Method Qualitative Quantitative 
Barrier 
Approach 
Predictive 
Component 
Updating 
Mechanism 
CCPS (2003)      
Dunbobbin et al. 
(2004) 
   
  
Bajpai and Gupta 
(2005) 
 
  
  
Moore et al. (2007)      
Moore (2013)      
SVAPP      
 
While there are existing qualitative approaches that consider both barrier and protection, 
they fail to provide the importance of both barrier and protection in quantitative terms 
that helps to develop priorities and procedure to act. Furthermore, the approaches are 
subjective in nature as the results and analysis are driven by analyst’s experience and the 
understanding of the threats. As opposed to this a quantitative approach, SVAPP provides 
an objective understanding of the effectiveness of barriers and protection. Additionally, it 
helps to predict relative importance of different options while offering a clear and 
repeatable analysis. This is done by building the barriers upon the 'Rings of Protection' 
adopted from CCPS as shown in Figure 2-1, to have more descriptive and well-defined 
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barriers. Figure 2-2 provides details of these rings of protection and security barrier 
analysis.              
The authors recognize the current literature against the use probabilistic 
approaches involving intelligent adversaries (Brown and Cox 2011; National Research 
Council 2008). However, the use of a probabilistic risk approach is only to set initial 
probabilities based on existing conditions and these probabilities are updated based on 
events that occur. The goal of this paper is to bring awareness to the chemical industry 
about probabilistic security risk assessments and thus the need to create a database 
pertaining to security related failures. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has widely 
been used by chemical facilities to help make informed safety risk management decisions 
(Ezell et al., 2010). As mentioned earlier, most of the available literature on security risk 
analysis is qualitative and there is a lack in the use of quantitative methods. This 
proposed method transitions a probabilistic safety barrier approach into a probabilistic 
security attack barrier approach. Modarres et al. (2006) states that the main purpose of the 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis is identifying the system components that contribute the 
highest amount of risk along with executing various risk reduction strategies. Simply, a 
PRA determines a risk value, based on the probability and a consequence. PRA can be 
conducted in multiple ways through fault or event tree analysis and/or Bayesian 
Networks. A Bayesian Network (BN) is a graphical technique composed of directed arcs 
between nodes that represent variables and their respective relationships. 
 Fault tree analysis is a well-known approach, which assists in the calculation of 
probability of system failure or barrier failure. The top event of a fault tree defines the 
system or barrier failure. The causation of the top event is represented as fault tree 
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comprising of intermediate and basic events connected through logic gates. Each basic 
event is assigned a failure probability through historical data, literature, or in some cases 
expert judgment. Event tree analysis is used to show the sequence of conditions that lead 
to consequences. These conditions are represented as barriers, which are considered as 
independent of each other. When a barrier fails, the next subsequent barrier is activated. 
The failure probabilities or the events will lead to the occurrence probabilities of the 
different consequences.  
 Bayesian networks show relationships between events through the use of directed 
arcs and nodes (Ezell et al., 2010). These directed acyclic graphs connect existing fault 
and event trees through a technique called mapping. This mapping process is described 
by Bobbio et al. (2001), where the basic events (root cause of a system failure) of the 
fault tree become a parent node in a BN while the gate becomes a child node in the 
network. The connections in a BN are denoted by arcs which represent a direct causal 
relationship between the two nodes. A parent node will have a direct arc drawn to a child 
node. The conditional dependence of child node is represented in conditional probability 
table (CPT). This table match the logic defined in the fault tree (i.e. AND/OR logic). 
With the CPT logic well-defined, the BN child node probability can be evaluated using 
Equation 2-1, where Xi represents any child node:  
𝑃[𝑋1, 𝑋2, . 𝑋𝑛] = ∏ 𝑃[𝑋𝑖|𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑋𝑖−1)]
𝑛
𝑖=1            (2-1) 
Relaxation assumptions manipulate the CPT of existing nodes in the Bayesian Network 
in order to deviate away from its structured Boolean logic. This enables the CPT to better 
accurately depict the relationship between the nodes for a given situation.  
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Díez and Druzdel (2007) outline various CPT manipulation techniques such as 
Leaky-OR, Noisy-OR, and Noisy-AND. These CPT manipulation techniques or 
relaxation assumptions will be used in the methodology to represent various scenarios. 
Noisy-OR refers to the chance that a particular event may not occur because it was 
inhibited by an external factor. In other terms, each parent node is independent of the 
other and even if they are active it may not trigger the child node to be active. The 
probability that the parent produces the child is denoted by ci while the probability that 
the inhibitor is active is denoted by qi. The relationship is displayed in Equation 2-2:   
𝑐𝑖 = 1 − 𝑞𝑖                          (2-2)                                                                                     
In the case of multiple parent nodes to a single child node, the child node probability can 
be calculated by using Equation 2-3. 
𝑃(𝑍|𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛) =  1 − ∏ 𝑞𝑖𝑖∈𝑥                                                                                  (2-3) 
Where Z represent the event of interest and 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛 represents parents nodes 
(dependence).  
The Noisy-OR technique is a particular case of the Leaky-OR, where is leaky parameter 
is equal to zero. The leaky parameter, cL, is able to account for the modeling of combined 
influence factors that have not been explicitly modeled as it is nearly impossible to 
include all components for computation. With the leak parameter included, the child node 
probability can be calculated through the use of Equation 2-4, below: 
𝑃(𝑍|𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋𝑛) = 1 −  ∏ (1 − 𝑐𝑖)𝑖∈𝑥 × (1 − 𝑐𝐿)                                                        (2-4) 
The other relaxation assumption illustrated by Díez and Druzdel (2007) is the Noisy-
AND and in this technique the child node can either be substituted or inhibited. As in the 
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case with Boolean logic, multiple parent nodes are active to cause the child node. If a 
node is not active then it is replaced with a substitution probability, denoted as si. Thus, a 
parent node will contribute either an inhibitor or substituted probability based on whether 
it is active or not. Equation 2-5, shows how the child node probability can be calculated.  
𝑃(𝑍|𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛) = ∏ 𝑐𝑖𝑖∈𝑥 × ∏ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝑥                                                                           (2-5) 
2.3 Proposed SVAPP Methodology 
The goal of the SVAPP methodology is to perform a quantitative security 
vulnerability assessment and use it to assign initial failure probabilities to the barriers 
subjectively which are built on the ‘Rings of Protection’; evaluate the consequences 
probabilistically and take measures to prevent the security attacks. Following this, the 
prior failure probabilities of barriers can be predicted and used to update the probabilities 
of the consequences. The SVAPP methodology has four main components which are (i) 
system definition, (ii) security vulnerability assessment modelling, (iii) decision 
making/strategy implementation and (iv) predict the prior failure probabilities of security 
barriers and continually update the security attack likelihoods as shown in Figure 2-2. 
The first phase is to define the system in which the analysis will take place, which may 
include establishing system boundaries and establishing goals for the system. For a 
chemical facility, each system will have sub systems that may contain multiple elements 
that can interact with each other. It is crucial to have an understanding of each system as 
well as the interactions and dependencies. 
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Figure 2 - 2: Proposed SVAPP Methodology Phases 
The next step in the methodology is to complete the security vulnerability analysis 
and develop the security attack model. A Security Vulnerability Analysis (SVA) can be 
conducted by following API Recommend Practice 780 (2013) as it provides a holistic and 
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comprehensive approach for conducting an SVA and therefore the reader is referred to 
API 780. Based on the outcomes of the chemical facility’s SVA, an appropriate attack 
model path can be outlined and thus relevant security barriers can be developed to block 
such an attack. Previous security methods have been developed to prevent or limit the 
consequence of an attack, which is an intentional act to cause harm. The worst case form 
of attack would be an act of terrorism that could cause devastating economic, 
environmental and human damages. An attack can happen in a number of ways.  
Therefore, trying to model an attack can be quite challenging.  As viewed in the 'Rings of 
Protection', an attacker would have to go through various layers of security in order to 
reach the critical process equipment. Following this logic, a proposed barrier based attack 
model is shown in Figure 2-3 below. The model shows that once Safe Conditions are no 
longer valid there are three barriers that could prevent the event from escalating. If the 
External barrier was to fail then the subsequent barriers would be available. 
 
Figure 2 - 3: Proposed Attack Model 
Reniers (2010) proposed that physical security should be broken down into three main 
areas: structural, electronic, personnel. This concept has been implemented into the 
External, Internal, Interior, and Critical barrier. The last barrier in the attack model is the 
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Fail-Safe barrier. Additionally, there are two external barriers that may affect the process 
of an attack, which are the Political and the Management and Organization Barriers. Each 
layer of protection or barrier can be modeled using fault and event tree analysis and thus 
mapped into Bayesian Networks.  
The authors have previously developed a proposed fault tree for each barrier (van 
Staalduinen and Khan 2015), The reader is referred to this work for more elaboration on 
the fault tree analysis. The External security barrier is a chemical facility's first line of 
defense against an impending attack and is illustrated in Figure 2-4. Failure of this barrier 
allows an adversary access on the chemical plant's property. In order to prevent an 
adversary from gaining access to a chemical plant's buildings, the Internal security can be 
implemented, which is shown in Figure 2-5. The subsequent barrier is the Interior 
security barrier and the goal of this barrier is prevent unauthorized personnel or 
adversaries from accessing employee offices. The mapping of this barrier’s fault tree is 
displayed in Figure 2-6. The Critical security barrier is designed to prevent adversaries 
from accessing key access points in a chemical facility such as a process control room. 
Figure 2-7 shows mapping of the associated fault tree.  
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Figure 2 - 4: Proposed Mapping of fault tree for External Barrier 
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Figure 2 - 5: Proposed Mapping of fault tree for Internal Barrier 
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Figure 2 - 6: Proposed Mapping of fault tree for Interior Barrier 
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Figure 2 - 7: Proposed Mapping of fault tree for Critical Barrier 
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In a chemical plant, the last line of defense against an attacker is the Fail-Safe barrier. 
This fault tree mapping is shown in Figure 2-8. The Management and Organization 
barrier holds the ability to intervene any time during an impending attack. However, it is 
difficult to assess this barrier’s effect as it may differ from industry to industry and even 
from company to company. Nonetheless, seven key factors have been identified and 
sorted into either the organization or management barrier. This is displayed in Figure 2-9.  
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Figure 2 - 8: Proposed Mapping of fault tree for Fail-Safe Barrier 
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Figure 2 - 9: Proposed Mapping of fault tree for Management and Organization Barrier 
The mapping of the fault tree for the Political barrier, shown in Figure 2-10, is a very 
crucial barrier in this model and accounts for conditions that are exogenous of a chemical 
facility. This barrier is broken into three main sub elements that are laws and 
enforcement, terrorism, and crime. The laws and enforcement barrier reflects the 
country/region that the facility is currently located in, to protect and keep safe the 
workers and the plant. Meanwhile, the crime barrier demonstrates the severity of hostage 
situations, stealing and armed attacks that may affect the operations. Finally, the terrorism 
barrier reveals the various forms of terrorism that can potentially hurt a chemical 
processing operation. Grothaus (2014) defines these types of terrorism below:  
 State – the government uses it to regulate/control its population 
 Religious –use of an ideology to justify use of terror 
 Pathological – use of terror for personal enjoyment 
 Issue-Orientated – group inflicts terror to bring awareness to a certain problem 
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 Separatist – use of terror to overthrow the current government and establish a new 
one 
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Figure 2 - 10: Proposed Mapping of fault tree for Political Barrier 
Similar to the mapping of fault trees, event trees can be mapped in BN to form event 
networks.  
The authors have previously developed a proposed event tree (van Staalduinen and Khan 
2015), the reader is referred to this work for more elaboration on event tree analysis. For 
illustration, the event network is shown in Figure 2-12.  
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Figure 2 - 11: Proposed Event Tree (van Staalduinen and Khan, 2015) 
The developed event network is shown in Figure 2-12. The consequences node is 
separated into seven various outcomes, which are herein described. Since there is no 
current available literature on security related consequence definitions, these descriptions 
have been developed to closely depict each situation.  
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Figure 2 - 12: Proposed Mapping of the event tree for BN Network 
A Safe term is defined as normal daily operating conditions, in which there are no 
issues. 
 A Near Miss is a situation in which there is potential for damage or losses to 
occur but however it does not. For example, if an adversary attempts to get past security 
with false documentation but is stopped by security.  
 An Incident can be described as an event that causes minor damage to a chemical 
facility while production still is operational. An illustration of this would be for an 
adversary is attempting to break into a building on chemical facility's property. 
 A Light Attack is a case where major damage has been caused to the facility with 
a minor loss in production. In addition, harm may come to employees. This event can be 
compared to an adversary gaining access to the facility and creating a leak in a pipeline or 
tank.  
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 An event can be a Considerable Attack when there is greater financial damage to 
facility, loss in production, and workers have been injured. Furthermore, an attack at this 
level would draw local news coverage. 
 A Severe Attack is defined as event where operations are stopped, excessive 
financial damage has been accomplished and there may be employee fatalities. In 
addition, this type of event could inflict damage to the environment and create national 
news.  
 The last consequence, a Devastating Attack can be classified as event where 
multiple fatalities have occurred, financial losses and damages would be catastrophic and 
it would generate international news. Moreover, the plant would halt operations for 
months, possibly longer as with the case of the In Amenas gas refinery attack.  
A summary of the various types of consequences is displayed in Table 2-2 below.  
Table 2 - 2: Consequence Comparison 
Consequence Financial  
Loss 
Production 
Loss 
Worker 
Injuries 
News 
Coverage 
Safe - - - - 
Near Miss - - - - 
Incident Insignificant - - - 
Light Attack Minor Minor 
First Aid 
Treatment 
- 
Considerable Attack Moderate Moderate 
Lost Time 
Injury 
Local 
Severe Attack Major Major Fatality National 
Devastating Attack Catastrophic Catastrophic Fatalities International 
 
With the appropriate barriers and mapped fault trees established, subjective quantification 
of the basic event’s probability can be found. The purpose of this is to establish initial 
probabilities that can later be updated based on real plant data.  
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 The third phase and fourth phases in Figure 2-2 are dedicated to predicting the 
number of future abnormal events in the next interval and updating the barrier failure. 
Rathnayaka et al. (2011) have already explored and developed a highly detailed approach 
and therefore the reader is referred to their work as their method was applied directly. In 
the third phase, the predictive model is executed which is based on the development of 
the proposed BNs. This model predicts the occurrence of abnormal events in the next 
time interval considering history of the abnormal events and also current state of the 
operation. The fourth phase, executes a Bayesian updating mechanism to improve the 
initial beliefs of the system. These initial beliefs or prior probabilities are updated from 
the new data as likelihood probabilities to new posterior probabilities. Furthermore, this 
phase proposes and/or implements the risk reduction strategies. 
2.4 Case Study 
In order to illustrate the overall effectiveness of the proposed methodology, a case study 
is completed on an LNG processing plant, shown in Figure 2-13. As described previously 
the first step in the SVAPP methodology is to define the system. In a nominal LNG plant, 
there are typically three main processing areas: gas treatment, liquefaction, and storage. 
Each unit can hold various types of flammable chemicals which are potential targets for 
an adversary. 
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Figure 2 - 13: LNG Gas Treating Plant 
The second phase is completion of a security vulnerability analysis (SVA) 
described by API (2013). A brief discussion on a SVA is described earlier, however for a 
more complete guide; the reader is referred to the original work. The initial step is 
planning, which will be composed outlining the objectives of the SVA by multi-skilled 
team to. Next step is facility characterization that aims to identify possible targets, layers 
of protection and determines the attractiveness of each target in addition to determining 
the possible consequences. For the LNG facility, possible targets are power generation 
unit, gas treating trains, and storage tanks. Threat assessment is the third step in 
conducting an SVA and the following threats have been identified with the help of ACC 
(2001):  
 Control room cyber attack 
 Intentional release of LNG storage tanks 
 Intentional attack on processing equipment 
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 Loss of power 
The subsequent step is the vulnerability analysis, which will pair both targets and threats. 
This will recognize probable process security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, existing 
security countermeasures are identified along with their effectiveness to reduce the 
vulnerability. By executing a variety of scenarios, the level of vulnerability for each asset 
is assessed. The final step is recommending further countermeasures that may be 
implemented in the chemical facility based on consequences and likelihood.  
 Throughout the conduction of the SVA, multiple scenarios of an attack would be 
discussed. This information would provide much needed insight in preparation of the 
third phase of the proposed methodology. As mentioned earlier, the third phase is the 
development of the attack model that places emphasis on layers of protection for a 
chemical facility. For the purpose of the case study, it is determined that a threat is 
unlikely. As described by Díez and Druzdel (2007), the causation probability is assigned 
based on expert judgment, which for the purpose of this methodology should be provided 
by security risk experts. For the purpose of this case study the values of probability are 
hypothetical and are displayed in Tables 2-3 – 2-9. The causation probability is 
designated on the basis of the parent probability that it is able to still able to cause the 
child node even if all other parent nodes are not active. In reality, this value should be 
discussed and determined by the Security Risk Assessment team. The numbers generated 
in this case study are illustrative to demonstrate how the methodology can be 
implemented. 
Table 2 - 3: Basic Event Failure probabilities for External Barrier                 
BN Nodes Failure Assigned Causation 
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Probability Probability 
Structural 
Perimeter Fence 1.488E-03 0.75 
Entrance/Exit Gates 2.414E-02 0.60 
Bollards 3.265E-02 0.65 
Trenches 7.613E-03 0.45 
Perimeter Fence 1.488E-03 0.75 
Electrical 
 
Power 1.022E-02 0.65 
Line of Sight Sensor 5.156E-02 0.60 
Video Motion 8.848E-03 0.70 
Lighting 1.693E-02 0.70 
Personnel 
Bag Check 3.414E-03 0.50 
Person Inspection (Patdown) 8.661E-03 0.45 
Vehicle Inspection 9.611E-03 0.70 
Documentation 5.429E-03 0.75 
External 
Intrusion Device - 0.60 
Electronic - 0.70 
Structural - 0.60 
Personnel - 0.60 
 
Table 2 - 4: Basic Event Failure probabilities for Interior Barrier 
BN Nodes Failure 
Probability 
Assigned Causation 
Probability 
Structural 
Road Conditions 2.800E-04 0.7 
Manual Locked Doors 3.698E-02 0.6 
Manual Locked Windows 1.619E-02 0.55 
 
Electrical 
 
Badge Swipe 5.038E-03 0.7 
Power 9.638E-03 0.7 
Line of Sight Sensor 5.111E-03 0.65 
Video Motion 8.819E-03 0.75 
Lighting 1.283E-02 0.65 
Personnel 
Reception 8.400E-03 0.7 
Mobile Security 1.304E-02 0.75 
Internal 
Intrusion Device - 0.65 
Electronic - 0.75 
Structural - 0.65 
Personnel - 0.65 
 
Table 2 - 5: Basic Event Failure probabilities for Internal Barrier 
BN Nodes Failure 
Probability 
Assigned Causation 
Probability 
Structural 
 
Limited Access Points 6.400E-03 0.7 
Manual Locked Doors 8.056E-03 0.65 
Electrical 
 
Card Readers 5.108E-03 0.75 
Power 5.961E-03 0.75 
Boundary Penetration 5.954E-03 0.7 
Biometric Access 1.420E-03 0.65 
Point Sensors 6.463E-03 0.6 
Personnel 
 
Visitor Escort 3.200E-04 0.75 
Employee Awareness 6.100E-04 0.7 
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Interior 
Intrusion Device - 0.7 
Electronic - 0.8 
Structural - 0.7 
Personnel - 0.7 
 
Table 2 - 6: Basic Event Failure probabilities for Critical Barrier 
BN Nodes Failure 
Probability 
Assigned Causation 
Probability 
Structural 
 
Limited Access Points 4.700E-04 0.75 
Manual Locked Doors 8.398E-04 0.7 
Electrical 
 
Biometric Access 4.507E-04 0.7 
Power 2.032E-04 0.8 
Video Motion 7.058E-04 0.75 
Network Firewall 1.303E-04 0.8 
Personnel 
Visitor Restriction 8.000E-03 0.8 
Employee Awareness 6.900E-04 0.75 
Critical 
Intrusion Device - 0.75 
Electronic - 0.85 
Structural - 0.75 
Personnel - 0.75 
 
Table 2 - 7: Basic Event Failure probabilities for Fail-Safe Barrier 
BN Nodes Failure 
Probability 
Assigned Causation 
Probability 
Physical 
Manual Shutdown 9.985E-05 0.85 
Manual Alarm 1.520E-05 0.85 
Electronic 
Electronic Shutdown 6.293E-05 0.8 
Electronic Alarm 3.441E-05 0.8 
Fail-Safe 
Electronic - 0.9 
Structural - 0.9 
 
Table 2 - 8: Basic Event Failure probabilities for Management and Organization Barrier 
BN Nodes Failure 
Probability 
Assigned Causation 
Probability 
Organization 
Inadequate Security Program 4.300E-03 0.8 
Inadequate Communication 3.300E-03 0.8 
Inadequate Staff & 
Resources 
2.900E-03 0.8 
Inadequate Planning 4.100E-03 0.8 
Management 
Poor Communication 4.700E-03 0.8 
Inefficient Management 
Behaviors 
4.400E-03 0.8 
Inadequate Security Practice 6.500E-03 0.8 
Management 
and 
Organization 
Organization - 0.85 
Management - 0.85 
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Table 2 - 9: Basic Event Failure probabilities for Political Barrier 
BN Nodes Failure 
Probability 
Assigned Causation 
Probability 
Terrorism 
State 7.400E-04 0.75 
Religious 8.000E-03 0.7 
Pathological 6.000E-05 0.65 
Issue-Orientated 5.300E-03 0.6 
Separatist 7.700E-03 0.8 
Crime 
Hostage 5.000E-04 0.7 
Stealing 2.400E-04 0.65 
Armed Attacks 2.200E-03 0.7 
Laws 
Protecting Workers 1.900E-03 0.7 
Protecting Operations 8.100E-03 0.7 
Enforcement 
Worker Protection 6.900E-03 0.75 
Operation Protection 4.400E-03 0.75 
Political 
Barrier 
Laws - 0.8 
Enforcement - 0.8 
Laws & Enforcement - 0.7 
Crime - 0.7 
Terrorism - 0.7 
 
Based on the previous work of the authors (van Staalduinen and Khan 2015) it was found 
that the Noisy-AND relaxation technique that best reflected realistic conditions. The 
reader is referred to this work for more details. Utilizing the above basic failure 
probabilities and the Noisy-AND relaxation assumption with a constant substitution 
probability of 0.05, each respective barrier failure probability are calculated through the 
use software called Netica (2014). Using the Fail Safe barrier as an example, Table 2-10 
below illustrates how Netica calculates the failure occurrence probability (this can be 
applied to any intermediate node). Since there are only two parent nodes for the Fail Safe 
barrier, there are only four logic scenarios. The BN condition is determined by the parent 
node failure probability while the Noisy-AND condition is determined by the causation 
and substitution probabilities. For instance, the failure probability of the Manual node 
was calculated using Netica to be 1.130E-02 and the Electronic node to be 3.800E-02. 
Using these values and the causation probabilities in Table 2-12, the Fail Safe barrier 
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failure probability can be calculated. The following equations clarify how Netica 
calculates the failure probability for each node. For the BN condition, the value is 
determined by the Manual failure probability multiplied by the Safe probability. When 
the Manual node is Fail and the Electronic node is Safe: 
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑁 = 0.0113 × (1 − 0.038) = 0.01087 
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑦 − 𝐴𝑁𝐷 =  1 ∗ (1 − 0.9) ∗ (1 − 0.05) = 0.095 
The value of the probability being ‘1’ illustrates that no inhibitor was present (i.e. fail 
condition).  
Table 2 - 10: Example Calculation of Intermediate Node 
Logic Scenarios Network Conditions Fail Safe 
Node Manual  Electronic BN Noisy-AND 
Fail Fail 4.294E-04 9.500E-01 4.079E-04 
Fail  Safe 1.087E-02 9.500E-02 1.033E-03 
Safe Fail 3.757E-02 9.500E-02 3.569E-03 
Safe Safe 9.511E-01 9.500E-03 9.036E-03 
Fail Safe Failure Probability 1.400E-02 
 
These values are displayed in the Table 2-11 below with the estimated prior occurrence 
probabilities that were determined through the event network that was constructed from 
the event tree. The occurrence probabilities are calculated by using the security barrier 
failure probabilities and the mapped event network. As shown by Rathnayaka et al. 
(2011), the prior probability of the consequence severity level k, (k=1,2,3, etc), denoted 
by P(Ck), is shown in Equation 2-6: 
𝑃(𝐶𝑘) =  ∏ 𝑥𝑖
𝜃𝑖,𝑘
𝑗∈𝑆𝐵𝑘 (1 − 𝑥𝑖)
1−𝜃𝑖,𝑘                                                                           (2-6) 
Where SBk denotes the security barrier associated with level k. If the level of k failure 
passes into the next security barrier, i, then θi,k = 1; otherwise, θi,k = 0. For example, using 
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the Event Tree in Figure 2-11, the Safe Occurrence Probability is calculated using  
Equation 2-6 as follows: 
𝑃(𝐶𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒) = (1 − 𝑃(𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙)) × (1 − 𝑃(𝑀&𝑂)) × (1 − 𝑃(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙))
= (1 − 0.0647) × (1 − 0.0226) × (1 − 0.0317) =  0.8852 
Table 2 - 11: Failure and Consequence Occurrence Probabilities 
Security Barrier Failure Probability Consequence (Ck) Occurrence 
Probability P(Ck) 
External 6.470E-02 Safe 8.852E-01 
Internal 4.800E-02 Near Miss 7.876E-02 
Interior 2.700E-02 Incident 3.386E-02 
Critical 1.590E-02 Light Attack 2.096E-03 
Fail- Safe 1.400E-02 Considerable Attack 9.993E-05 
M & O 2.260E-02 Severe Attack 2.645E-06 
Political 3.170E-02 Devastating Attack 6.034E-08 
 
The final and key aspect of the third phase is the predictive modeling that assists in the 
forecasting of future security related events based on existing information. Table 2-12 
shows the cumulative number of consequence events for the past twelve months.  
Table 2 - 12: Cumulative Number of Consequence Events from past 12 months 
Month Safe 
Near  
Miss 
Incident 
Light  
Attack 
Considerable  
Attack 
Severe  
Attack 
Devastating  
Attack 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 
4 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 
5 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 
6 5 2 1 1 0 0 0 
7 6 2 2 1 0 0 0 
8 6 3 2 1 0 0 0 
9 8 3 3 1 0 0 0 
10 8 4 3 2 0 0 0 
11 9 4 3 2 0 0 0 
12 10 4 3 2 0 0 0 
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Following the outlined model provided by Rathnayaka et al. (2011), the mean 
value of the posterior distribution was estimated to 1.58. Therefore, the average number 
of security consequence events in the next month is 2.  
 The final phase of the SVAPP methodology is to update the failure probabilities 
to minimize uncertainty through Bayesian updating and make important decisions on 
security countermeasures. Once again following the method by Rathnayaka et al. (2011), 
the likelihood probabilities have been developed and are shown in Table 2-13. The 
likelihood probabilities are based on consequence event data in Table 2-12. Due to the 
lack of severe attacks, in the past twelve months the later barriers cannot have likelihood 
probabilities developed. Subsequently, the posterior failure probabilities of the barriers 
can be calculated and are shown in Figure 2-14.  However, since last four barriers in the 
table are unable to be updated they are assumed to have such a low failure rate that it is 
now negligible. With the updated barrier failure probabilities, the respective occurrence 
probabilities can also be determined. These values are displayed in Figures 2-15 – 2-18. 
The updated value for Light Attack is a reflection that as the Interior barrier increases in 
failure than the more likely a Light Attack will occur. Note that the values for the Critical 
barrier and beyond are zero as there were no incidents reported. This shows the Critical 
barrier was effective.  
Table 2 - 13: Developed Likelihood Probabilities 
Month External Internal Interior Critical Fail Safe M&O Political 
1 0.500 0.000 - - - - - 
2 0.333 0.000 - - - - - 
3 0.400 0.500 0.000 - - - - 
4 0.333 0.500 0.000 - - - - 
5 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.000 - - - 
6 0.444 0.500 0.500 0.000 - - - 
7 0.455 0.600 0.333 0.000 - - - 
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8 0.500 0.500 0.333 0.000 - - - 
9 0.467 0.571 0.250 0.000 - - - 
10 0.529 0.556 0.400 0.000 - - - 
11 0.500 0.556 0.400 0.000 - - - 
12 0.474 0.556 0.400 0.000 - - - 
 
 
Figure 2 - 14: Posterior Failure Probability of Security Barriers 
 
Figure 2 - 15: Updated Safe Consequence Occurrence Probability 
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Figure 2 - 16: Updated Near Miss Consequence Occurrence Probability 
 
Figure 2 - 17: Updated Incident Consequence Occurrence Probability 
 
Figure 2 - 18: Updated Light Attack Consequence Occurrence Probability 
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For the sensitivity analysis, in order to see how each barrier has an impact on the 
consequences, one barrier failure probability was increased by 10% at a time while the 
others remained at the initial estimated prior probabilities as shown in Table 2-14. For 
example, Scenario 2 alters the External barrier while the other barrier failure probabilities 
remain the same. Scenario 3 returns the External barrier   to the original value but alters 
the Internal failure probability. This continues for the remaining scenarios. The event 
network uses these probabilities to develop new occurrence probabilities which are 
shown in Figures 2-19 – 2-21. Through those figures it can be noted that Scenarios 5 to 7 
do not affect the more severe consequences, therefore more attention can be focused 
improving the first few barriers of a plant’s defense.  
Table 2 - 14: Scenarios with Respective Probabilities 
Barrier 
 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
Scenario 
6 
Scenario 
7 
Scenario 
8 
External 6.47E-02 7.12E-02 6.47E-02 6.47E-02 6.47E-02 6.47E-02 6.47E-02 6.47E-02 
Internal 4.80E-02 4.80E-02 5.28E-02 4.80E-02 4.80E-02 4.80E-02 4.80E-02 4.80E-02 
Interior 2.70E-02 2.70E-02 2.70E-02 2.97E-02 2.70E-02 2.70E-02 2.70E-02 2.70E-02 
Critical 1.59E-02 1.59E-02 1.59E-02 1.59E-02 1.75E-02 1.59E-02 1.59E-02 1.59E-02 
Fail- 
Safe 
1.40E-02 1.40E-02 1.40E-02 1.40E-02 1.40E-02 1.54E-02 1.40E-02 1.40E-02 
M & O 2.26E-02 2.26E-02 2.26E-02 2.26E-02 2.26E-02 2.26E-02 2.49E-02 2.26E-02 
Political 3.17E-02 3.17E-02 3.17E-02 3.17E-02 3.17E-02 3.17E-02 3.17E-02 3.49E-02 
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Figure 2 - 19: Scenario and Consequence Occurrence Probability 
 
Figure 2 - 20: Scenario and Consequence Occurrence Probability 
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Figure 2 - 21: Scenario and Consequence Occurrence Probability 
Further analysis can be completed on the event network and how each of the barriers may 
in reality interact with each other. Currently the network is set up as each barrier being d-
separated from each other. The concept of d-separation was introduced by Geiger et al 
(1990). In a BN, two nodes are considered to be d-separated if a path between the two 
nodes is blocked by a diverging, serial, or converging pattern. Thus if they are d-
separated then the nodes are considered independent.  Figure 2-22 displays the new event 
network showing the dependency among the barriers.  
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Figure 2 - 22: Event Network with Dependencies 
In this new event network, the conditional probability tables of each barrier node can be 
manipulated to reflect the degree of dependency. Therefore, in order to see how each of 
the various degrees of dependency can affect the various consequences, five separate 
cases have been developed. The different cases are described as: 
 Case 1 - utilizes AND/OR logic 
 Case 2 - all CPT values equal to 0.50 
 Case 3 - all CPT values equal to 0.50 except when all Fail conditions occur, then 
use 1 for Fail 
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 Case 4 - all CPT values equal to 0.50 except when all Safe conditions occur, then 
use 1 for Safe 
 Case 5 - expert judgment is used to represent realistic conditions 
To help clarify the differences in Cases 3 and 4, the CPT of the External Barrier are 
shown in Tables 2-15 and 2-16. For each case since the Political barrier was the 
influencing node, it remained constant throughout the analysis, with the initial prior 
estimated failure probability of 0.032.  Figure 2-23 displays each barrier's calculated 
failure probability for the respective cases and Figure 2-24 shows how the consequence 
occurrence probabilities were affected.  
Table 2 - 15: External Node CPT Case 3 
Political Node Safe Safe 
Management 
and 
Organization 
Node 
Safe Fail Safe Fail 
External 
Node 
Safe 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 
Fail 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
 
Table 2 - 16: External Node CPT Case 4 
Political Node Safe Safe 
Management 
and 
Organization 
Node 
Safe Fail Safe Fail 
External 
Node 
Safe 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Fail 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
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Figure 2 - 23: Case with Barrier Failure Probability 
 
Figure 2 - 24: Case with Consequence Occurrence Probability 
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2.5 Analysis of Case Study 
The proposed methodology utilizes five sequential barriers with two overseeing 
barriers to illustrate the attack process. The prior failure probability of each barrier was 
initially estimated using a subjective probabilistic approach with a relaxation assumption 
known as Noisy-AND. These probabilities were updated using illustrative plant’s 
‘abnormal event’ data that represent more realistic conditions. For example, the plant was 
initially operating a Safe condition at 88.5% but improved to 94.2%. A Light Attack 
probability decreased from initial estimate of 0.21 to 0.006 of occurring. Although some 
of the consequences eventually updated to a 0. Probability of occurring, this is simply not 
the case. These consequences will have a small probability of happening however; it is so 
small that it is reflected as 0.0% in the analysis.  
  When each barrier failure probability was changed one at a time, it became 
apparent how each barrier affected the possible consequences. For example, in Scenario 
2, when the External barrier failure probability was increased all types of the attack 
probabilities increased. This was also the case for Scenario 8, when the failure probability 
of the Political barrier was increased. Based on this analysis, both the External and 
Political barriers are deemed the most important in the attack model sequence.  This 
result is expected as the External barrier is a chemical facility's first line of defense in an 
attack prevention and the Political barrier attempts to model conditions that surround a 
chemical facility.  
 In the barrier dependency analysis, that the Political node has a direct correlation 
to the occurrence of a Devastating Attack. This is an expected result, as is the case with 
most attacks the intent is to cause as much damage as possible. When utilizing AND/OR 
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logic, each node was calculated to have the same probability as the node which 
influenced, which is the Political node. The most interesting case is Case 5, which 
attempted to show realistic conditions. From an attack model's perspective this case 
makes the most sense as an attacker will typically attempt to create a Devastating Attack 
and the goal of chemical facility will be to attempt to prevent any attack from occurring 
which would count as a near miss.  
2.6 Conclusion 
In recent years, chemical processing plants have become targets for terrorists to 
attack as they hold toxic and flammable materials under pressurized conditions. The goal 
of these intentional attacks is to inflict damage to not only plant property but also the 
workers at the plant. Therefore, it is imperative to further develop security risk 
assessments to ensure that site security guidelines can be properly implemented.  
The case study shows that the proposed SVAPP methodology applied to chemical facility 
security offers reliable information of modeling and predicting an intentional attack. In 
addition, the model displays various relaxation techniques that are applied to BN to best 
suit the interactions between events and barrier failure. The use of Bayesian updating 
allows for the uncertainty to reduce and allows the failure probabilities to reflect a more 
realistic value based on recent plant conditions. This in turn reflects reduced probability 
occurrence of possible consequences at chemical facility. The event barrier network was 
modified to show possible dependencies among the barriers. Through manipulation of the 
conditional probability tables a realistic condition was displayed, which reflected 
consequences nominally seen in security related attacks. These conditions are that 
chemical plants typically operate at a safe condition and that successful intentional 
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attacks on them are usually classified as devastating. Utilizing this information, the 
overall security performance can be increased and effective countermeasures can be in 
put in place to prevent an intentional attack from occurring. 
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Chapter 3: Functional Quantitative Security Risk Analysis (QSRA) to Assist in  
Protecting Critical Process Infrastructure 
3.0 Abstract 
This article proposes a quantitative security risk assessment methodology that can 
assist management in the decision-making process where and when to protect critical 
assets of a chemical facility. An improvement upon previous work is the approach of 
conducting concurrent Threat and Vulnerability Assessments, as opposed to a sequential 
approach. Furthermore, this method introduces a Bow Tie risk model mapped into a 
Bayesian Network model that allows for various logical relaxation assumptions to be 
applied. Different uncertainty relaxation approaches such as “Noisy-OR” and “Leaky 
Noisy-OR” and “Noisy-AND” are tested to improve threat and vulnerability likelihood. 
Finally, integrating threat/vulnerability likelihood with potential losses, the security risk 
is quantified. The potential security countermeasures are characterized into either 
decreasing vulnerability or decreasing threat likelihood and are reassessed considering a 
cost analysis. A theoretical case study is conducted to exemplify the execution and 
application of the proposed method.  
Keywords: quantitative security risk analysis, Bayesian network, bow-tie risk model 
3.1 Introduction 
The movement in the academic world to widen risk assessments to include 
security-related incidents began after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New 
York. In recent years, industry and policy makers have realized that chemical process 
facilities may be attractive soft targets for terrorists as they often store hazardous 
chemicals in large quantities. With the availability of hazardous materials, it becomes 
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easier for a terrorist to inflict casualties, negatively impact the environment, cause huge 
property damage, and disrupt business operations and local or even global economies. 
For example, recent events in both Iraq and Algeria show the need to protect chemical 
plants from intentional acts to cause damage (Statoil ASA, 2013; Reuters News Agency, 
2015).   
Previously, risk assessments focused on unintentional, naturally occurring events 
to maintain plant safety and integrity. Recently, risk managers focus also on security 
countermeasures and their ability to control the loss due to possible deliberate acts of 
terrorism. There are two distinct approaches that can be executed to conduct a security 
risk assessment: ‘asset-driven’ and ‘threat-driven’ (or also called ‘scenario-based’). 
McGill et al. (2007) define an asset-driven analysis as an approach that assesses the 
consequences and probability of an adversary’s success for a given set of possible 
scenarios. The total risk is estimated using these scenarios with the threat likelihood, in 
turn based, amongst others, on the level of attractiveness of the process plant. Thus there 
is a need for intelligence on an adversary’s intent and possible threats. In contrast, a 
threat-driven (or scenario-based) approach uses a set of predefined scenarios based on 
assumed adversary capabilities. The rate of occurrence can be predicted from historical 
data after studying the various hazards of a threat. The fallible component of this 
approach is that an innovative adversary may develop a new threat, previously unknown 
to the intelligence community.   
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (2003) was among the first to release a 
document to assist industry in the procedure of completing a so-called security 
vulnerability assessment. In addition to presenting a systematic methodology, the 
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document also provided insight into the concepts and background of chemical security 
such as the concept of “Rings of Protection”. The primary principle of this concept is that 
each ring will independently have the ability to block an adversary from accessing the 
next level and successfully achieving their malicious intent. The Center for Chemical 
Process Safety presents a five step method to complete a security vulnerability 
assessment (SVA): (1) Project Planning, (2) Facility Characterization, (3) Threat 
Assessment, (4) Vulnerability, (5) Identify Countermeasures. This methodology, when 
combined with other hazard reducing steps, can help to increase the success of security 
risk management.  
Building upon this concept Bajpai and Gupta (2005) propose an alternative 
security risk assessment. This semi-quantitative approach is based on four main steps: (1) 
Threat Analysis, (2) Vulnerability Analysis, (3) Security Countermeasures, (4) Mitigation 
and Emergency Response. A novel idea presented in this method is the use of a security 
risk factor table. This table provides rankings from 1 (low) to 5 (high) of various risk 
factors affecting a given chemical facility. When summarized, these factors give the total 
current risk status of the facility. The model however does not capture the economic costs 
that may come from security countermeasures implementation.   
Furthermore, McGill et al. (2007) subsequently propose a quantitative 
methodology helping investment decision-making regarding resource protection for 
critical assets. A key aspect of this method is the development of an annual risk profile 
for each critical asset along with a rate of occurrence. With a quantitative approach, the 
impact of possible security countermeasures through cost-benefit analysis becomes 
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straightforward for management. However, the methodology provides no distinction of 
the type of benefit, whether it minimizes the threat or reduces the vulnerability.  
White (2014) further extends the then current Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) programs and proposes the Asset Vulnerability Model (AVM). The AVM is 
designed to assist in the development of an acceptable risk assessment approach for the 
industry. A risk baseline analysis is first established followed by a cost-benefit analysis 
which is utilized to support countermeasure decision making. This model does not 
provide a risk tracking or monitoring feature that is able to assist in continual analysis of 
the baseline risk.  
Most recently, Argenti et al. (2015) studies the attractiveness of chemical 
installations being possible targets for terrorist activities. They adopted a semi 
quantitative approach to model the attractiveness of the target. The authors considered 
plant damage potential (in terms of causing fatalities) and perceived value (in terms of 
perceived political and socio-economic value) as two main factors, and used a scoring 
method to characterize these factors. It appears that socio-economic and political factors 
tend to play key role in defining the attractiveness of a target.  
The goal of this current paper is to propose a methodology that can be used for 
security risk assessments and security risk mitigation through dynamic risk probabilities. 
Current literature sometimes criticises the use of fixed probabilities (National Research 
Council, 2008; National Research Council Press, 2010). This methodology allows for the 
probabilities to be reassessed if the risk is too high or a trigger calls for reassessment. 
Currently, the established precedent is to complete the Threat assessment and 
Vulnerability assessment in a sequential order (CCPS, 2003; Bajpai and Gupta, 2005; 
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API, 2013). However, this work suggests carrying out these two assessments 
concurrently as this will lead to information being helpful in either task to be shared. This 
methodology is constructed from the authors’ previous work (van Staalduinen and Khan, 
2015) and other available literature in the area of chemical security (McGill et al. 2007; 
Reniers et al., 2013). Section 2 explores the tools and techniques that are executed in the 
proposed method while Section 3 provides a holistic view of the proposed methodology. 
Section 4 displays how the method can be executed via a case study, the results being 
discussed in Section 5. Conclusions are provided in Section 6. 
3.2 Analysis Techniques 
3.2.1 Bow-Tie Model 
A Bow-Tie (BT) model is a graphical technique composed of a fault tree on the 
left-hand side with a corresponding event tree on the right-hand side. Hence, a complete 
scenario with the causes on the left connected to a top event (or ‘initiating event’) with 
the subsequent consequences on the right is obtained (Delvosalle et al., 2005).  
3.2.2 Bayesian Network 
A Bayesian network (BN) or influence diagram is a graphical technique 
composed of directed arcs and nodes. These nodes and directed arcs represent variables 
and their relationships to each other, respectively. Conditional probabilities are assigned 
to each node displaying the conditional probability dependencies among the variables. A 
BN node probability can be calculated by Equation 3-1 
𝑃[𝑋1, 𝑋2, . 𝑋𝑛] = ∏ 𝑃[𝑋𝑖|𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑋𝑖)]
𝑛
𝑖=1           (3-1) 
where Parent(Xi) is the parent set of Xi (Jensen and Nielson, 2007). Additionally, a BN 
uses Bayes Theorem, which can update the prior occurrence of primary events based on 
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new evidence, E, that may become available in time. This relationship is shown in 
Equation 3-2: 
𝑃(𝑋𝑖|𝐸) =
𝑃(𝑋𝑖,𝐸)
𝑃(𝐸)
=  
𝑃(𝑋𝑖,𝐸)
∑ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖,𝐸)𝑖
            (3-2) 
Furthermore, when working within a BN, the conditional probabilities and hence the 
conditional probability tables (CPT) can be manipulated to show various relaxation 
assumptions such as the Noisy-OR, Leaky Noisy-OR, and Noisy-AND (Díez and 
Druzdzel, 2007). The Noisy-OR logic assumption is defined as a parent event may occur; 
however, the child may not occur as there was an inhibitor that prevented the occurrence. 
Meanwhile, the Leaky Noisy-OR follows this same logic but includes a leak parameter. 
 This leak parameter accounts for all possible parent events that are not explicitly 
modeled. The Noisy-AND logic follows that of Boolean logic however in this case the 
parent event will either be inhibited or substituted. The substitution factor replaces the 
parent if the event does not occur. These assumptions are extensively covered in a 
technical report presented at a conference (van Staalduinen and Khan, 2015). We refer 
the interested readers to this technical report for more information. 
3.2.3 Bow-Tie Mapping 
Both the fault and event tree of a developed BT can be mapped in a BN. Bobbio 
et al. (2001) provides a technique for mapping a fault tree. The primary and intermediate 
events in the fault tree become primary and intermediate nodes in a BN where the logic 
relationship is defined in the CPT. Meanwhile the event tree can be mapped by using the 
technique presented by Bearfield and Marsh (2005). In the mapped event tree, each node 
has two states, one for success and one for failure while the consequence node will 
include all possible consequences. It should be noted that a directed arc should be drawn 
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from one barrier to another if that barrier influences the next barrier. In addition, a 
connection needs to be made from the barrier node to the consequence node. With both 
the fault and event tree mapped, the diagrams are then combined through the pivot node 
which is the top event of the fault tree. A generic mapped BT into a BN is shown in 
Figure 3-1. Furthermore, Khakzad et al. (2013) demonstrates that mapping a BT into a 
BN allows for a more relaxed structure of a BT and additional modeling aspects such as 
probability updating. Various barriers are developed which minimize the consequences of 
an attack while the number of available barriers may differ for each critical asset. 
ConsequenceBarrier 1
Barrier 2 Barrier 3
TE
IE1 IE2
PE1
PE2 PE3
PE4
 
Figure 3 - 1: General Mapped Bow-Tie Model 
3.3 Quantitative Security Risk Assessment Methodology (QSRA) 
The first step in the QSRA methodology is to conduct an Asset Characterization 
of all assets to find out which ones are designated as critical. With critical assets 
recognized, a Threat and Vulnerability Assessment is conducted concurrently to ensure 
information is shared during the completion of the Attack Scenario Likelihood and 
Consequence Assessment. The Risk Assessment is finalized and the risk is determined to 
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be acceptable or unacceptable. If the risk is deemed unacceptable, countermeasures are 
identified to either minimize the threat or vulnerability of the critical assets. A cost 
analysis of the recommended risk reduction strategies is completed to determine the most 
optimal solution which can be implemented. Once implemented, the methodology should 
be repeated to confirm that the risk is at an acceptable level. Risk monitoring and tracking 
is organized to have a reassessment of critical assets if a trigger is alerted. Execution of 
the proposed Quantitative Security Risk Assessment (QSRA), as shown in Figure 3-2 
below, will help to develop a security plan and aid its implementation for improving plant 
security.  
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4. Attack Scenario 
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5. Attack Scenario 
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9. Implementation 
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Countermeasures
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Figure 3 - 2: The Proposed Methodology 
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3.3.1 Asset Characterization 
The first step in asset characterization is to identify all potential critical assets located on 
a chemical plant. This can be completed by a plant walk-through or by reviewing plant 
layout diagrams including piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs). The next step is 
to determine the criticality of the assets through the analysis of three factors: (1) Social, 
(2) Economic, and (3) Political. Each factor is given a score out of ten, where ‘one’ is 
lowest and ‘ten’ is highest. The social factor considers how potential damage would 
impact society. The economic factor analyzes the financial costs. Lastly, the political 
factor relates to the potential that an adversary would see this asset as a target. In 
addition, the plant can be segregated into various zones that can group multiple potential 
assets together. The creation of zones allows for security countermeasure dependency to 
be displayed between each asset existing in the zone. At this stage all current security 
countermeasures should be identified. Reniers (2010) e.g. proposes that security 
countermeasures be broken down into distinct sections, such as Organizational, Physical, 
Electrical, and Personnel. Delineating security countermeasures into different groups, 
they can be better identified and organized for management. From this stage, only the 
selected critical assets will be counted in the assessment. 
3.3.2 Threat Assessment 
With the critical assets of a chemical facility determined, the next phase is to 
assess the possible threats with respect to the assets. Baybutt and Reddy (2003) state that 
a threat has several sources: internal and external sources. An internal threat may come 
from a disgruntled employee or contractor who may seek to cause economic loss to the 
company by disrupting the production of the plant. An external threat may be an 
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adversary or terrorist group that wishes to exploit a chemical plant to cause maximum 
impact through casualties and damage to process equipment. A third type of threat is a 
combination of both an internal and an external threat: an outsider planning an attack 
with the help of an insider. This would allow for the worst-case scenario to develop. An 
inside threat allows the exploitation of the weaknesses within a facility. Based on these 
types of threats, the potential attacks can be determined through the availability of 
intelligence information.  
3.3.2.1 Asset Attractiveness 
Once the classes of threats are identified, the next step is to assess the asset 
attractiveness. Asset attractiveness is defined by API Recommended Practice 780 (2013) 
as an approximated value of a target to a threat, where the target is a critical asset of a 
plant. Therefore, asset attractiveness analysis must be taken from the perspective of the 
adversary where often the intent is to cause the maximum damage to a chemical plant. In 
order to assist in identifying the critical assets, a methodology has been proposed to 
assess site security risk (van Staalduinen and Khan, 2015). The Political barrier 
represented in the methodology allows the authors to establish the threat credibility. The 
authors have developed a table to assist with assigning a likelihood term once threat 
credibility is developed, shown in Table 3-1. The threat credibility is from the perspective 
of a potential attack. 
Table 3 - 1: Threat Credibility  
Ranking Threat Credibility (Probability) Threat Likelihood Term 
1 < 0.01 Remote 
3 0.01 – 0.10 Unlikely 
4 0.10 – 0.25 Likely 
5 0.25 – 0.50 Probable 
6 > 0.50 Very Likely 
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3.3.3 Vulnerability Assessment  
In the case of the vulnerability of an asset, the first step is to develop the various 
consequence scenarios on the chosen critical assets and zones. The key point in this step 
is to outline all possible scenarios in which the critical asset/zone could be attacked based 
on known weaknesses, and determines the type of consequence that would occur. Various 
types of consequences are shown in Table 3-2 that have been adapted from Haight (2013) 
who initially developed consequences based on a safety accident.  
Table 3 - 2: Consequence Definition 
Consequence Loss 
Term 
Human Health Environmental Property Damage 
Business 
Interruption 
Insignificant Multiple injuries None < 100K < 5 days 
Minor Serious injuries 
inflicted 
Localized clean 
up 
> 100K > 5 days 
Major Fatality  Exceed permit 
conditions 
> 1M > 10 days 
Severe Multiple fatalities Observable 
effects 
> 5M > 30 days 
Catastrophic > 10 fatalities Remediation 
required 
> 10 M > 60 days 
 
3.3.4 Attack Scenario Likelihood Assessment 
Once the various consequence scenarios have been developed the next step is to establish 
the likelihood for each type of attack scenario. Sorting the attacks into groups such as 
manned, vehicle, and aerial allows for simpler quantification. A manned attack is defined 
as an individual or group of people that executes force to enter the plant while a vehicle 
attack is a single or group of people with a motorized vehicle. The term aerial attack will 
be specific to drone attacks. The likelihood of an attack can be developed and quantified 
by modifying the Political barrier based on the type of attack. As noted in Figure 3-3, the 
likelihood of an attack relies on two major intermediate nodes, that is, Terrorism and 
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Crime, which are further detailed to provide simpler causes of an attack. This assessment 
can be modeled using a Bayesian Network of a mapped fault tree, with the top event 
being a successful attack. Figure 3-3 expands the original work of van Staalduinen and 
Khan (2015) which was developed based on recent incidents in the area of chemical 
security risk. However, extensive work to validate the figure through case studies is part 
of ongoing research. 
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Figure 3 - 3: Mapped Fault Tree of Attack 
The basic event probabilities can be estimated using expert judgment or with the help of 
an intelligence agency. A key factor to consider is that each probability of the basic 
events will be altered based on the type of attack scenario but the structure of the network 
will remain the same. Since the end goal of any threat is to conduct an attack, this model 
development will assist in the understanding of an attack likelihood.  
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3.3.5 Attack Scenario Consequence Assessment 
Building upon the previous step, a Bow-Tie (BT) model can be developed. 
Various barriers are developed minimizing the consequences of an attack; however, the 
number of available barriers may differ for each critical asset. This methodology will 
consider that a facility will have three security barriers in response to an attack and a 
critical asset may have one or more of these barriers. Furthermore, not all the barriers 
may be activated as in the case of an aerial attack where the ‘external barrier’ will not be 
activated.  
Similar to the previous work of the authors (van Staalduinen and Khan, 2015), the 
external barrier is a passive barrier designed to lessen the impact of an attack. The second 
barrier which is an internal barrier would be a transitional barrier from passive to reactive 
in which a mobile security team comes into action against an adversary. The critical 
barrier is the third security barrier of a plant. This barrier would be considered to have 
blast proof rooms for protection of workers and additionally a response of local law 
enforcement to deal with the adversary. Each barrier may play a different role in 
minimizing the consequence, as the external barrier is more passive while the critical 
barrier becomes reactive. The fully developed BT model is shown in Figure 3-4.  
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Figure 3 - 4: Mapped BT Model 
However, for an aerial attack the BT model will need to be modified, as an aerial attack 
would bypass the External and Internal barriers, if these barriers do not take such aerial 
attack into consideration. This network is shown in Figure 3-5.  
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Figure 3 - 5: Aerial Attack BT Model 
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3.3.6 Risk Assessment  
With the BT model completed, the baseline risk for the critical asset should be 
determined. To this end, the critical asset is placed into a specific asset group based on 
the criticality determined in the Asset Characterization. Table 3-3 matches the criticality 
score to the asset group number.  
Table 3 - 3: Asset Group Designation 
Criticality Range Asset Group 
0.00 – 5.99 1 
6.00 – 6.99 2 
7.00 – 7.99 3 
8.00 – 8.99 4 
9.00 – 10.0 5 
 
Based on the consequence, a US dollar value can be matched against the asset group. 
Table 3-4 shows that the higher the criticality of an asset, the higher the cost becomes, as 
the severity of the consequence increases. This table is developed based on the losses 
associated with past security events. The values in the table are guiding values, these may 
be changed according to the region of application. 
Table 3 - 4: Asset Group to Severity Matching 
Consequence 
Severity 
Asset 
Group 1 
Asset 
Group 2 
Asset 
Group 3 
Asset 
Group 4 
Asset 
Group 5 
Insignificant 50 K 100 K 250 K 500 K 1 M 
Minor 250 K 500 K 750 K 1 M 10 M 
Major 500 K 1 M 5 M 10 M 50 M 
Severe 1 M 10 M 25 M 50 M 100 M 
Catastrophic 10 M 50 M 100 M 250 M 500 M 
 
The baseline risk can be calculated for a given scenario by multiplying the consequence 
severity value by scenario likelihood. The calculated baseline risk will subsequently be 
used to compare different scenarios and also security countermeasures 
111 
 
proposed/implemented. Therefore, any uncertainty and subjectivity in consequence 
assessment will have limited impact on the quality or interpretation of the study. 
3.3.7 Identification of Countermeasures  
The identification of security countermeasures is necessary to determine any 
security shortcomings in a chemical plant and to examine methods to improve security 
for a critical asset. Two types of security countermeasures can be distinguished (besides 
other possible classifications). Internal security countermeasures would increase 
protection within the plant, thus lessening the vulnerability of an asset. An external 
security countermeasure would increase protection on the external level with intent to 
decrease the threat of an attack. Additional security countermeasures will have an 
associated cost and therefore an economic analysis should be completed to determine the 
optimal solution.  
3.3.8 Cost Analysis of Risk Reduction Strategies 
With the baseline risk established, a list of possible security countermeasures is 
created along with their associated costs and a new estimated risk level with the selected 
measure implemented. To compare the importance of a countermeasure, a risk-reduction 
versus cost ratio is defined in Equation 3-3 as a modified version from White (2014): 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
=
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
                             (3-3) 
This ratio allows management to select the most cost effective protection of an asset 
within a defined budget. The Estimated Risk after countermeasure of the risk-reduction 
vs cost ratio is based on expected value theory. The advantage of this non-normative 
approach is that it is user-friendly for organizations, while the downside is that the 
approach gives the perception of accuracy, although it only has a limited predictive 
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resolution, depending on the information available and on the assumptions made. The 
Bayesian decision theory, the most state-of-the-art in decision sciences, which is a neo-
Bernoullian utility theory, sees the economics of operational safety as a normative 
decision support tool with considerable predictive resolution. However, the disadvantage 
of this approach is that its user-friendliness should be improved in order to be widely 
employed. In any case, one may opt to use one of both, or both, approaches to adequately 
deal with safety or security related decisions. Most important is that the approaches are 
carried out in a correct way. 
In the present study, expected value theory is employed mainly due to the 
following arguments: i) its user-friendliness, ii) its point of reference, and (iii) being easy 
to understand. It should be stressed, however, that no matter what theory is used, results 
depend on the quality of input data and decision-makers should always be careful in their 
interpretation of the results and subsequent decision-making. Further research is needed 
to increase the quality of results and to ensure optimal decision-making.  
3.3.9 Implementation of Countermeasure 
With the security countermeasures selected for implementation based on the risk-
reduction versus cost ratio, the methodology is redirected to the Critical Assets phase. 
Reassessing from the Critical Asset point will allow for more accurate determination of 
the new risk profile. Therefore, if the risk remains at an unacceptable level, then 
additional security countermeasures should be continually implemented until an 
acceptable level is reached.  
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3.3.10 Risk Monitoring and Tracking 
To assist with the tracking of security risk for a chemical plant, security 
performance indicators should be established. Such indicators should complement those 
of safety and aim to establish, implement, and follow-up on corporate policies and 
acceptance criteria (Øien et al., 2011). Planned investigations of the organization and 
administrative procedures along with audits are tools that can be used for follow-up 
activities. Øien et al. (2011) found that there are typically two types of performance 
indicators: reactive and proactive. Reactive indicators are typically obvious after an event 
has occurred while proactive indicators employ factors and underlying causes to help 
provide an early warning. When the asset characterization, threat, vulnerability, and risk 
assessments are completed, the most effective security risk indicators can be determined. 
 Reniers et al. (2013) propose Threat Assessment (TA) triggers, which can be 
defined as an event or situation that results in changes in a threat level. While Reniers 
focuses on threat assessment, these same triggers can be sorted and viewed as security 
performance indicators as well. Nine triggers were proposed: (1) Technology, (2) 
Neighbouring activity, (3) Politics and prosperity, (4) Company’s characteristics, (5) 
Incidents and accidents, (6) Remarks and suggestions, (7) Legislation and regulations, (8) 
Topicality and relevant factors, (9) Learning from external events. For a detailed 
explanation of these triggers, the reader is referred to Reniers et al. (2013) and the 
references therein. The TA trigger of company characteristics can be further broken into 
low and high level company characteristics. In 2012, the Department of Homeland 
Security (2012) released a guide to help raise security awareness in the chemical industry. 
114 
 
The DHS document (2012) lists five major security indicators: (1) Surveillance, (2) 
Elicitation, (3) Tests of security, (4) Acquiring supplies, (5) Suspicious people/behaviour.  
 Using the literature mentioned earlier, a holistic security performance indicator 
list can be developed based on sorting the indicators into either proactive or reactive. The 
finalized list is shown in Table 3-5 below. 
Table 3 - 5: Security Risk Indicators 
Security Risk Indicator Proactive Reactive 
Technology   
Neighbouring activity   
Politics and prosperity   
Low-level company characteristics   
High-level company characteristics   
Incidents and accidents   
Remarks and suggestions   
Legislation and regulations   
Topicality and relevant factors   
Learning from external events   
Surveillance   
Elicitation   
Tests of security   
Acquiring supplies   
Suspicious people and/or behaviour    
 
A slight change in any indicator may prompt for a re-assessment of the security program.  
3.4 Case Study 
To illustrate how the proposed methodology can be implemented on an existing 
chemical facility, the following example is herein presented. An illustrative Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) plant will be considered as shown in Figure 3-6. For the purpose of 
illustration, we consider a plant which is in a remote location and is quite far from the 
nearest city. The numbers generated in this case study are illustrative to demonstrate how 
the methodology can be executed. 
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Figure 3 - 6: Case Study of LNG Facility 
3.4.1 Asset Characterization 
The purpose of this initial step is to determine which of the assets located on the plant are 
critical. Table 3-6 lists various assets and their appropriately assigned criticality scores on 
a Likert scale for the purpose of demonstration, where a score of 1 represents low impact 
and a score of 10 represents a highest impact. For example, the Admin building is 
assigned a score of 1 for a social factor as attack on it would have a least impact socially. 
However, it would have a medium economic impact due to the resources it may hold 
such as data storage and hence a score of 5 is assigned. The Admin building is more 
inclined to be attacked by an adversary as employees of the facility will be present during 
the working day and will have a higher political impact and hence a score of 7 is 
assigned. Taking the average of the three factors gives the Admin building a criticality 
score of 4.33. Likewise, other scores are assigned. 
Table 3 - 6: Asset Criticality Designation 
Asset Social Factor Economic Factor Political Factor Criticality 
Admin 1 5 7 4.33 
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Operations Center 6 8 8 7.33 
Utilities 7 8 8 7.67 
Power Generation 3 8 8 6.33 
Chemical Storage 8 7 9 8.00 
Gas Gate 5 6 5 5.33 
Flare 7 6 5 6.00 
LNG Storage 7 8 10 8.33 
Barge Loading 5 4 5 4.67 
Gas Treating Train 9 9 9 9.00 
 
We assume that the facility security program determines that any asset with a 
criticality higher than or equal to 6.5 is considered to be a critical asset. However, for the 
purpose of the case study only the Operations Center will be investigated. Once the 
critical assets have been selected, the existing security countermeasures need to be 
identified. The LNG facility has a fenced-in perimeter with security controlling entrance 
and exit gates. The security countermeasure for the operations center is displayed in 
Table 3-7. 
Table 3 - 7: Operation Center Countermeasures 
Countermeasure Class Countermeasures 
Physical Locked doors, Limited access points 
Electrical/Electronic Lighting, CCTV, Motion detector, Card Readers 
Personnel Mobile Security, check-in desk 
 
3.4.2 Threat Assessment 
Once the critical assets and current security countermeasures have been identified, 
the next step is to complete a Threat Assessment. This begins with listing possible threats 
to the facility. For the purpose of this case study, we use only an external threat. We 
further assume that facility management has been in contact with intelligence agencies.  
To assist with asset attractiveness, the threat credibility must first be determined. This is 
completed by using a part of a model previously proposed by van Staalduinen and Khan 
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(2015). The Political barrier considers the external conditions of a given chemical facility 
and helps to determine threat probability. This probability is matched to a likelihood 
term, thus allowing a threat credibility to be established. The threat probabilities were 
developed using expert judgment and available literature and the operations center threat 
probability from the Political barrier was set at 3.98E-02, which, based on Table 3-1, 
implies that a threat against the operations center is unlikely. 
3.4.3 Vulnerability Assessment 
In the initial stage of the vulnerability assessment all possible attack scenarios are 
developed based on the weaknesses of an asset and the type of threat perceived. The goal 
of this step is to illustrate the type of attack that can be achieved for a given threat, based 
on possible intrusion routes and deliveries of attacks. Various attack scenarios are shown 
in Table 3-8 for the operations center.  
Table 3 - 8: Attack Scenarios for Operation Center 
Intrusion Route Delivery Consequence 
Main gate 
Manned Minor 
Vehicle Minor 
Forest 
Manned Minor 
Vehicle Major 
Waterway Manned Minor 
Air Aerial-Drone Severe 
 
3.4.4 Attack Scenario Likelihood Assessment  
There are three types of attack scenarios that we employ in the suggested BT 
model to develop the attack likelihood. As discussed, earlier the basic event probabilities 
can be developed with expert judgment or with the aid of an intelligence agency. 
However, for the purpose of the case study the developed probabilities are used for 
illustrative purposes. In each BT model, for each additional logic relaxation assumption 
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used, the corresponding probabilities have also been calculated (Causation, Leak, and 
Substitution). The causation probability is assigned on the basis that the parent event will 
cause the child event to occur when acting alone. The substitution probability is 
designated for the likelihood of the parent event and will be replaced if the original 
condition is not met. Table 3-9 displays all these probabilities for the primary nodes while 
Table 3-10 displays the probabilities for the intermediate nodes. The leak probability was 
assumed to be 1.00E-02 for all nodes which is designated under the assumption that the 
child node may still occur when none of the parent nodes are active. The primary node 
probabilities would be relative values as they would be assigned based on information 
from the intelligence community.  
Table 3 - 9: Primary Node Probabilities 
BN Node 
Manned Vehicle Aerial 
Basic 
Event 
Causation Substitution 
Basic 
Event 
Causation Substitution 
Basic 
Event 
Causation Substitution 
Economic 1.15E-
04 
7.00E-01 
1.00E-01 
6.53
E-04 
7.50E-01 
5.00E-02 
6.47
E-05 
6.50E-01 
1.00E-02 
Eco-terror 5.39E-
04 
4.40
E-04 
6.80
E-05 
Martyrdom 2.12E-
04 
6.56
E-04 
5.91
E-05 
Marginal-
ization 
6.34E-
04 
4.87
E-04 
5.31
E-05 
Sponsorship 9.01E-
04 
5.07
E-04 
6.36
E-05 
State 1.22E-
04 
3.96
E-04 
5.49
E-05 
Separatist 3.58E-
04 
1.00
E-04 
4.00
E-05 
Change of 
Government 
6.09E-
04 
4.21
E-04 
8.15
E-05 
Pathological 9.61E-
04 
5.89
E-04 
9.48
E-05 
Sensitive Info 3.52E-
04 
7.50E-01 
2.22
E-03 
8.00E-01 
7.45
E-04 
6.00E-01 
Resources 1.44E-
04 
7.02
E-03 
1.61
E-04 
Capital 6.50E-
04 
7.83
E-03 
3.18
E-04 
Foreign 
Workers 
9.09E-
04 
2.64
E-03 
3.75
E-04 
Foreign 
Visitors 
2.86E-
04 
1.85
E-03 
3.14
E-04 
Ransom 5.90E- 4.08 8.02
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Table 3 - 10: Intermediate Node Probabilities 
BN Node 
Manned Vehicle Aerial 
Causation Substitution Causation Substitution Causation Substitution 
Issue-
Orientated 
7.50E-01 
1.00E-01 
7.50E-01 
5.00E-02 
7.00E-01 
1.00E-02 
Religious 
Political 
Terrorism 8.00E-01 8.00E-01 8.00E-01 
Vandalism 7.50E-01 7.50E-01 6.00E-01 
Theft 
Hostage 
Crime 8.50E-01 8.50E-01 8.50E-01 
 
Using the above probabilities and the various BN relaxation assumptions, the attack 
probability for each scenario, based on the different logics, was determined. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3-7. In the below figure, it is shown that a vehicle attack has the 
highest probability followed by manned then aerial attacks.  
 
Figure 3 - 7: Graphical Display of Attack Likelihood for Type of Attack 
3.4.5 Attack Scenario Consequence Assessment 
With each type of attack likelihood developed, the consequences can be 
determined. For the mapped BN, the External barrier had a failure probability of 9.85E-
02 and the Internal barrier had a failure probability of 3.67E-02. The Critical barrier had a 
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failure probability of 1.30E-03 and the respective causation and substitution probabilities 
are shown below in Table 3-11.  
Table 3 - 11: Barrier Node Probabilities 
BN Node Manned Vehicle Aerial 
Causation Substitution Causation Substitution Causation Substitution 
Attack 8.00E-01 5.00E-02 7.00E-01 5.00E-02 7.00E-01 5.00E-02 
External 8.50E-01 7.50E-01 - 
Internal 9.00E-01 8.00E-01 - 
 
With the probabilities established, each consequence state probability is determined. The 
results for each type of attack are shown Tables 3-12 – 3-14. 
Table 3 - 12: Manned Attack Consequence Results 
Consequence Mapped BN Noisy-OR Leaky-Noisy OR Noisy-AND 
Insignificant 8.92E-01 9.95E-01 9.06E-01 7.83E-01 
Minor 1.03E-01 4.00E-05 1.82E-02 1.52E-01 
Major 4.01E-03 1.60E-04 3.60E-03 3.01E-02 
Severe 9.10E-04 7.40E-04 1.84E-02 1.12E-02 
Catastrophic 1.18E-06 3.70E-03 5.35E-02 2.34E-02 
 
Table 3 - 13: Vehicle Attack Consequence Results 
Consequence Mapped BN Noisy-OR Leaky-Noisy OR Noisy-AND 
Insignificant 8.73E-01 9.86E-01 9.03E-01 6.49E-01 
Minor 1.20E-01 3.80E-04 1.89E-02 1.93E-01 
Major 4.66E-03 1.10E-03 7.40E-03 6.53E-02 
Severe 3.02E-03 2.90E-03 2.17E-02 2.79E-02 
Catastrophic 3.92E-06 9.50E-03 4.93E-02 6.50E-02 
 
Table 3 - 14: Aerial Attack Consequence Results 
Consequence Mapped BN Noisy-OR Leaky-Noisy OR Noisy-AND 
Insignificant 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Minor 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Major 9.95E-01 9.99E-01 9.37E-02 8.31E-01 
Severe 4.79E-03 2.30E-04 2.01E-02 1.45E-01 
Catastrophic 4.55E-08 9.20E-04 4.30E-02 2.37E-02 
 
3.4.6 Risk Assessment 
The baseline risk profile can be calculated by matching the criticality asset group 
to the probabilities shown in the above tables. From Asset Characterization, the 
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operations center was found to have a criticality rating of 7.33. Therefore, it is in Asset 
Group 3 from Table 3-4. Figure 3-8 – 3-11 below display the risk for the operations based 
on each type of attack with the use of various logic assumption. 
 
Figure 3 - 8: Risk Profile based on Mapped BN 
 
Figure 3 - 9: Risk Profile based on Noisy-OR 
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Figure 3 - 10: Risk Profile based on Leaky Noisy-OR
 
Figure 3 - 11: Risk Profile based on Noisy-AND 
Based on the results of the risk assessment, Figures 3-9 through 3-11 indicate that 
a vehicle attack is at the highest risk for a catastrophic consequence. Therefore, security 
countermeasures must be added to reduce this risk. Figure 3-8 and 3-9 shows that without 
the use of the relaxation assumptions executed within the model, the results would not 
reflect reality accurately. As shown in Figure 3-10, the Leaky Noisy-OR relaxation best 
illustrates an attack on the plant as the most devastating consequences have the highest 
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risk. Recent incidents on chemical facilities from the past years illustrate that a 
coordinated vehicle attack poses the greatest risk. However, it should be noted that with 
the increase in drone technology, aerial attacks may become more frequent and may 
therefore entail a higher risk than anticipated based on casuistic information. 
3.4.7 Identification of Countermeasures 
To reduce the risk of the critical asset, additional countermeasures can be 
implemented. These security countermeasures can either attempt to minimize the asset 
vulnerability or minimize the threat to the asset. A list should be created of possible 
security countermeasures to implement along with the associated cost. Table 3-15 shows 
an illustrative list of additional security countermeasures that might be proposed for this 
LNG facility. The list is not at all exhaustive or comprehensive and many additional 
measures could be considered. 
Table 3 - 15: Security Countermeasure Proposals 
Countermeasure Description Cost ($/yr.) 
Facility Response 
Team (FRT) 
Create a facility response team that will immediately 
respond to a security alarm on the facility 
80,000 
Communication (C) Increase correspondence with local law enforcement and 
emergency response teams 
40,000 
Fortification (F) Install guard towers equipped for both day and night 
surveillance 
110,000 
FRT + C Facility Response Team plus Communication 120,000 
FRT + F Facility Response Team plus Fortification 190,000 
C + F Communication plus Fortification 150,000 
FRT + C + F Implement all three options 230,000 
 
3.4.8 Cost Analysis of Risk Reduction Strategies 
With the security countermeasures developed, the next step in the methodology is 
to complete a cost analysis. Chemical facilities will have budget restraints on the 
implementation of new security countermeasures. Therefore, it is imperative that 
maximum security be gained for a minimal cost. With the security countermeasures and 
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costs listed, the ensuing step is to estimate the effect of the security measure on the 
baseline risk. Table 3-16 shows the results of security countermeasure cost analysis based 
on Leaky Noisy-OR logic relaxation assumption. It was determined that this logic 
assumption best reflected realistic conditions. The baseline risk was calculated from 
using the catastrophic risk state probability of the Leaky Noisy-OR logic under a vehicle 
attack along with the matched severity for Asset Group 3 found in Table 3-4. The new 
estimated risk is determined by expert judgement based on the implementation of the 
security countermeasure through expected value theory.   
Table 3 - 16: Security Countermeasure Cost Analysis 
Countermeasure 
Baseline  
Risk ($) 
New Estimated 
Risk ($) 
Risk-reduction 
(Benefit) 
Risk-reduction 
versus Cost Ratio 
FRT 4,930,000 3,200,000 1,730,000 21.63 
C 4,930,000 4,000,000 930,000 23.25 
F 4,930,000 2,800,000 2,130,000 19.36 
FRT + C 4,930,000 2,270,000 2,660,000 22.17 
FRT + F 4,930,000 1,070,000 3,860,000 20.32 
C + F 4,930,000 1,870,000 3,060,000 20.40 
FRT + C + F 4,930,000 140,000 4,790,000 20.83 
 
From the illustrative cost analysis, it was found that the most optimal solution for the 
company is to fortify its perimeter with continual surveillance (Fortification 
countermeasure). 
3.4.9 Implementation of Countermeasures 
Once the optimum security countermeasure has been determined, it needs to be 
implemented into the LNG plant. The methodology must be repeated from Threat 
Assessment to accurately determine the risk level for the critical asset. This includes 
updating the developed BT for each attack scenario to ensure that the baseline risk level 
reflects the changes.  
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Starting with the Threat Assessment step, the threat credibility for the operations 
center will need to be reassessed, as a fortified perimeter will affect the asset 
attractiveness. With re-examination of the Political barrier, it was found that threat 
credibility was lowered to 9.23E-03 which changed the threat likelihood to ‘Remote’ 
based on Table 3-1. The Vulnerability Assessment phase will remain constant as the 
development for an attack to be carried, will not change.  
The implementation of the security countermeasure will require an updated 
Attack Scenario Likelihood Assessment. Basic event probabilities will be changed to 
reflect the new conditions and consulting with an intelligence agency or through the use 
of expert judgement can complete this. While the fortification of the perimeter would also 
affect a manned attack, only a vehicle attack is being considered. In the Leaky Noisy-OR 
conditions, the new attack likelihood is compared to previous likelihood in Figure 3-12 
below. Furthermore, the consequence state will be altered in the Attack Scenario 
Consequence Assessment. From these two steps, the new risk profile can be developed 
through the Risk Assessment step. The updated risk profile is compared with risk profile 
prior to the implementation of the security countermeasure. Through the analysis, the risk 
of a catastrophic event was actually $2.55 M, not $2.80 M that was previously estimated 
as illustrated in Figure 3-13. 
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Figure 3 - 12: Comparison of Changed in Attack Likelihood 
 
Figure 3 - 13: Comparison of Risk Profiles 
3.4.10 Risk Monitoring and Tracking 
The final step of the methodology is to create a risk monitoring and tracking 
program within the LNG facility. However, it may not be feasible to monitor and track all 
the security risk indicators listed in Table 3-5. Based on the location of the plant with the 
current surrounding conditions, the QSRA determined that the following indicators 
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should be tracked: (1) External technology, (2) Neighbouring activity, (3) Incidents and 
accidents, (4) Topicality and relevant factors, (5) Surveillance, and (6) Tests of security.  
3.5 Discussion of Case Study Results 
The elaborated QSRA methodology approach has been demonstrated through a 
case study on a typical LNG facility with the operations center selected as the critical 
asset. The various relaxation assumptions within the BT model, allow for the selection of 
the idealistic conditions which in our case was the Leaky Noisy-OR.  This is an expected 
result, as an attack will only need one individual or group to initiate an event to commit 
the attack, not a combination as is seen in the Noisy-AND condition. Furthermore, the 
leak parameter accounts for components that are not explicitly modeled and therefore 
accounts for any missing component that may lead to an attack on the facility.  
 Through the risk analysis, it has been shown that the plant has the highest risk for 
either low frequency-high consequence or high frequency-low consequence events. 
Therefore, it is imperative that security countermeasures be put in place to reduce both 
these types of events. The case study exemplified that with additional security 
countermeasures the risk can be lowered with an optimum cost. Furthermore, the case 
study illustrated that the greatest risk for the LNG facility was a coordinated vehicular 
attack. Previous history of attacks on chemical facilities was typically in the form of 
vehicle attacks; however, with increasing drone technology, aerial attacks may become 
more important in the future. 
3.6 Conclusion 
As chemical plants have become targets for terrorist groups in recent years, the 
need has arisen to develop a holistic security risk methodology. The QSRA methodology 
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discussed in this paper expands upon the five sequential steps suggested in the well-
known API document (2013) and adds concurrent steps that lead to the security risk 
assessment. A Bow-Tie model mapped in a Bayesian Network is utilized to allow for 
easy updating when certain plant conditions change and further assists in quantifying the 
security risk. The methodology herein described implements originality as it completes 
both a Threat and Vulnerability assessment concurrently rather sequentially. A key aspect 
of this methodology is the reliance on analysis and probability as there are no current 
statistics on the type of situations that security risk managers are faced with. The potential 
improvement in the proposed approach includes the consideration of uncertainty analysis, 
the inclusion of data gathering and processing, and the integration of the proposed 
approach with an online monitoring system. 
Future research will be aimed at advancing the quality of the input data while 
employing the expected value theory in our suggested QSRA method, as well as making 
Bayesian Theory, the current state-of-the-art in decision analysis, more user-friendly and 
incorporate it into the QSRA method, to further improve security risk decision-making. 
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Summary 
Security incidents may not be a common occurrence within the chemical industry 
however, the need to address these risks continues to exist. Chemical facilities hold 
hazardous materials and have dangerous operating conditions which a threat to the plant 
may look to exploit. Therefore, a robust and versatile risk based methodology to assist 
decision-makers needs to be established. The subjective approach illustrates adaptability 
to build networks to suit a specific facility based on its own security measures and 
external conditions. Two comprehensive methodologies have been proposed, SVAPP and 
QSRA, to contribute in the foundation for future work in the area of chemical security 
risk analysis. Both methodologies are structured on mapped BN which are advantageous 
for learning casual relationships to allow for a forecast of possible consequences. One 
key limitation of this work was the data for basic event probabilities. The collection of 
security data can be collected and maintained by a company, however due to the 
sensitivity of this data it is unlikely that it would be shared. This is one of the 
disadvantages of Bayesian Networks, as prior beliefs can misrepresent the entire network 
to give unacceptable results. Therefore, the use of an updating mechanism as executed in 
chapter 1 and 2 can help to eliminate that concern.  
The SVAPP methodology utilizes similar techniques that have been previously 
established in a safety methodology known as SHIPP. This would allow for an effortless 
combination of both methodologies to create one heuristic risk model to cover both safety 
and security.  
In the QSRA methodology both the loss and cost-benefit are simplified. This 
simplification is user-friendly and provides a quick estimation, however, the accuracy of 
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the results can suffer through this assessment. Future work should consider ways to 
further advance assessing consequence severity into a monetary value. Additionally, a 
method should be explored to enhance the assessment of additional security 
countermeasures.  
The SVAPP and QSRA methodologies proposed illustrate how the approach can 
assist risk managers to make an informed decision. The case studies utilized subject 
approach to build the barriers and expert judgement to form the initial failure 
probabilities. While both methodologies are mapped into Bayesian Networks, the key 
difference is that the QSRA employs a BT. The graphical technique of BN allows for 
CPT manipulation, however, these causation and substitution probabilities rely on expert 
judgment. This is one key limitation of the studies as gathering appropriate data is 
difficult to due the sensitivity of the security subject for corporations. 
Additionally, the current proposed methodologies apply a logic model to an illogical 
adversary. This can be corrected to incorporate the use of game theory which models 
conflict between two decision-makers.  
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